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V A L E R I A  M .  P E L E T  D E L  T O R O  
Beyond the Critique of Rights:  
The Puerto Rico Legal Project and Civil Rights 
Litigation in America’s Colony 
abstract.  Long skeptical of the ability of rights to advance oppressed groups’ political goals, 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars might consider a U.S. territory like Puerto Rico and ask, 
“What good are rights when you live in a colony?” In this Note, I will argue that CLS’s critique of 
rights, though compelling in the abstract, falters in the political and historical context of Puerto 
Rico. Although it may appear that rights have failed Puerto Ricans, rights talk has historically 
provided a framework for effective organizing and community action. Building on the work of 
Critical Race Theory and LatCrit scholars, this Note counters the CLS intuition that rights talk 
lacks value by focusing on the origins and development of the Puerto Rico Legal Project, an un-
derstudied but critical force for community development and legal advocacy on the island that was 
founded in response to severe political repression during the late 1970s and early 1980s. This Note 
draws on original interviews with Puerto Rican and U.S. lawyers and community activists to reveal 
ﬁssures in the critique of rights and to propose certain revisions to the theory. By concentrating on 
the entitlements that rights are thought to provide, CLS’s critique of rights ignores the power of 
rights discourse to organize marginalized communities. The critique of rights also overlooks the 
value of the collective efforts that go into articulating a particular community’s aspirations through 
rights talk, efforts which can be empowering and help spur further political action. By analyzing 
twentieth-century Puerto Rican legal and political history and the Puerto Rico Legal Project, I 
demonstrate the value (and limits) of rights in a colonized nation. 
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introduction 
On May Day 2017, thousands of Puerto Rican workers, students, and other 
groups demonstrated against draconian austerity measures ordered by the U.S.-
appointed ﬁscal oversight board, a controversial creation of the PROMESA law.
1
 
PROMESA, short for Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Sta-
bility Act, is a federal law designed to address Puerto Rico’s ballooning debt cri-
sis.
2
 The law established an oversight board with the power to override local 
government decisions, highlighting the territory’s status as a de facto U.S. col-
ony.
3
 In March 2017, the oversight board voted unanimously in favor of cuts to 
the public pension system,
4
 considered a $512 million cut in university funding,
5
 
and endorsed a plan to ﬁre government employees,
6
 transferring the weight of 
the island’s public debt of $72 billion onto the people of Puerto Rico.
7
 In re-
sponse, thousands took to the streets, carrying signs with slogans against U.S. 
 
1. See Puerto Rico National Strike Protests ‘Colonial’ Debt Crisis, TELESUR (May 1, 2017) [herein-
after Puerto Rico National Strike], https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Puerto-Rico 
-National-Strike-Protests-Colonial-Debt-Crisis-20170501-0014.html [https://perma.cc
/3BMY-YJZS]. 
2. See Vann R. Newkirk II, Congress’s Promise to Puerto Rico, ATLANTIC (May 19, 2016), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/congress-puerto-rico-bill-promise/483572 
[https://perma.cc/DB3T-RLAR]. “Promesa” is also Spanish for “promise.” 
3. See Puerto Rico National Strike, supra note 1. President Barack Obama appointed the seven 
members of the oversight board using a list of names crafted by Republican and Democratic 
leaders of Congress. See Patricia Guadalupe, Who Are the Members of the Puerto Rico Fiscal 
Control Board?, NBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/who 
-are-members-puerto-rico-ﬁscal-control-board-n640811 [https://perma.cc/8CWK-QD33]; 
AJ Vicens, These People Now Hold Puerto Rico’s Purse Strings, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/08/obama-presents-names-puerto-rico 
-control-board [https://perma.cc/L36D-3G78]. 
4. See Puerto Rico Debt Control Board Orders Harsh Austerity Measures, TELESUR (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Puerto-Rico-Debt-Control-Board-Orders-Harsh 
-Austerity-Measures-20170313-0006.html [https://perma.cc/4LE6-GU7Q]. 
5. See Ed Morales, Students Are Now Leading the Resistance to Austerity in Puerto Rico, NATION 
(Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/students-are-now-leading-the 
-resistance-to-austerity-in-puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/XN7L-EGXM]. 
6. See Joanisabel González, La Junta aprueba el plan ﬁscal entre recortes e impuestos, NUEVO DÍA 
(Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.elnuevodia.com/negocios/economia/nota/lajuntaapruebael 
planﬁscalentrerecorteseimpuestos-2300482 [https://perma.cc/MWF3-TE89]. 
7. See Michael Corkery & Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico’s Governor Says Island’s Debts Are 
‘Not Payable,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/business
/dealbook/puerto-ricos-governor-says-islands-debts-are-not-payable.html [https://perma
.cc/8BBR-6XD3]. 
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A protest of that size and manifesting such palpable anticolonial sentiment 
is unheard of in Puerto Rico. The questions of Puerto Rico’s political status—
whether Puerto Rico should become a state, independent, or something else—
and how best to describe Puerto Rico’s relationship to the United States have 
divided the island for almost seventy years.
9
 Since the 1950s,
10
 two centrist po-
litical parties have dominated political discourse on the island: the Partido Popu-
lar Democrático,
11
 which supports Puerto Rico’s current relationship with the 
United States, and the Partido Nuevo Progresista,
12
 which advocates for Puerto 
Rico’s statehood.
13
 In general, both parties have avoided describing Puerto Rico 
as a “colony” for tactical, political reasons.
14
 Even the legendary organizing 
 
8. See Puerto Rico National Strike, supra note 1. 
9. For a more detailed treatment of the debates surrounding Puerto Rico’s political status, see 
JORGE DUANY, THE PUERTO RICAN NATION ON THE MOVE: IDENTITIES ON THE ISLAND AND IN 
THE UNITED STATES 122-36 (2002); RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FU-
TURE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 1-38, 167-212 (Gerald L. Newman & Tomiko Brown-Nagin 
eds., 2015); and JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN 
THE WORLD 177-96 (1997). 
10. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which established Puerto Rico’s local 
governance structure, was adopted in 1952. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 
1869 (2016); CÉSAR J. AYALA & RAFAEL BERNABE, PUERTO RICO IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY: A 
HISTORY SINCE 1898, at 168 (2007). 
11. Spanish for “Popular Democratic Party.” 
12. Spanish for “New Progressive Party.” 
13. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RES. SERV., R44721, POLITICAL STATUS OF PUERTO RICO: BRIEF 
BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS FOR CONGRESS 6 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp
/crs/row/R44721.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7PC-ACUN]. The pro-independence party, the 
Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño (Spanish for “Puerto Rican Independence Party”) “has 
not received sufficient electoral support to be certiﬁed a major party” in recent years. Id. 
14. See Emilio Pantojas García, El Partido Popular Democrático: ¿Instrumento de cambio?, 80GRADOS 
(Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.80grados.net/el-partido-popular-democratico-instrumento-de
-cambio [https://perma.cc/9WCD-X6TB]; cf. Ángel Collado Schwarz, Opinion, La cláusula 
territorial que nos rige, NUEVO DÍA (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.elnuevodia.com/opinion
/columnas/laclausulaterritorialquenosrige-columna-2294141/ [https://perma.cc/3YBN 
-7QPZ] (noting that the difference between calling Puerto Rico a colony and a “free associated 
state,” which is the Partido Popular Democrático’s party platform, is a “question of semantics” 
(translated from Spanish)); Wilda Rodríguez, Opinion, Colonia a perpetuidad, NUEVO DÍA 
(Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.elnuevodia.com/opinion/columnas/coloniaaperpetuidad 
-columna-2310858/ [https://perma.cc/EGY4-NZP3] (noting that the Partido Nuevo Pro-
gresista “intend[s] to describe [Puerto Rico] only as a ‘Territory’ on the ballot”(translated 
from Spanish)). After the 2017 hurricane season, the pro-statehood party began to directly 
describe Puerto Rico as a “colony” or a “territorial colony” of the United States. Rafael Bernal, 
Puerto Rico Governor Asks Trump to Consider Statehood, HILL (Sept. 19, 2018, 6:11 PM), 
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against the U.S. Navy’s presence in Vieques,
15
 a situation with obvious colonial 
undertones, was careful “not to focus on Puerto Rico’s political status in framing 
the political response to Vieques.”
16
 The local movement in Vieques did not view 
itself as “an anti-imperialist mobilization,” but rather “framed its struggle as one 
of social justice and human rights,” priding itself on its ability to stay out of the 
island’s partisan struggles.
17
 Any articulation of rights, the privileges that come 
with U.S. citizenship, or even the meaning of the nation’s relationship with the 
United States, is inherently political in Puerto Rico. 
The debates surrounding Puerto Rico’s political status set the stage for a sec-
ond, equally contested question: would a rights-based approach be effective at 
rectifying Puerto Rico’s current socioeconomic and political condition? The fed-
eral government has long subjected Puerto Ricans to disparate treatment, which 
suggests that rights assertions may fall on deaf ears. Puerto Ricans, despite hav-
ing U.S. citizenship, do not beneﬁt from the same privileges as U.S. citizens liv-
ing on the mainland. For instance, U.S. citizens living in Puerto Rico lack voting 
power in Congress,
18
 which permits the imposition of institutions like the over-
sight board without any input from the island. Congress has also implemented 
 
https://thehill.com/latino/407494-puerto-rico-governor-asks-trump-to-consider-statehood 
[https://perma.cc/A9Z8-W7VU]; see also Jacqueline Serrato, If Someone Had a Doubt, Puerto 
Rico Is a Colony of the United States: Cruz, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 27, 2018, 7:20 PM), https://www
.chicagotribune.com/voiceit/ct-puerto-rico-is-a-colony-of-the-united-states-20180427 
-story.html [https://perma.cc/AS4T-2WYN] (quoting San Juan Mayor Carmen Yulín Cruz 
as saying, “If someone had a doubt before September 20, after September 20 they had to have 
come to the conclusion: Puerto Rico is a territory, a colony of the United States. To solve a 
problem[,] you have to accept it, and that means that we must wake up and stop allowing 
it.”). 
15. Vieques is an island off the southeast coast of Puerto Rico. See Katherine T. McCaffrey, Social 
Struggle Against the U.S. Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico: Two Movements in History, 33 LATIN AM. 
PERSP. 83, 83 (2006). The U.S. Navy occupied Vieques starting in the early 1940s and used it 
as a bombing range and a site for military training exercises. Id. at 84-85, 87. After four years 
of concentrated grassroots organizing against the military’s activities, the U.S. Navy left 
Vieques in May 2003. Id. at 83. I discuss the origins and signiﬁcance of this mobilization in 
Section III.B. 
16. Katherine McCaffrey, Forging Solidarity: Politics, Protest, and the Vieques Support Network, in 
THE PUERTO RICAN MOVEMENT: VOICES FROM THE DIASPORA 329, 334 (Andrés Torres & José 
E. Velázquez eds., 1998). 
17. Id. at 335. 
18. See Sandra Lilley, Puerto Rico Is Part of the U.S.: Here’s a Few Things to Know, NBC NEWS (Oct. 
03, 2017, 9:47 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/puerto-rico-crisis/puerto-rico 
-part-u-s-here-s-few-things-know-n807101 [https://perma.cc/R797-5L6M] (“Puerto Ri-
cans in the island do vote for a resident commissioner who represents the island’s interests in 
Washington, D.C., but is not a voting member of Congress.”). 
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federal aid programs differently in Puerto Rico than in the ﬁfty states.
19
 For ex-
ample, Puerto Rico receives much less health-care funding than the states,
20
 and 




The disparate treatment of Puerto Ricans became even more stark after the 
2017 hurricane season, when Hurricanes Irma and Maria pummeled Puerto Rico. 
While President Trump said that his administration had done an “incredible” 
job responding to the crisis,
22




19. See Juan R. Torruella, A Dissenting Concurrence: An Opinion About the Bicentennial, 34 FED. B. 
NEWS & J. 352 (1987), reprinted in GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ, THE CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF 
PUERTO RICO AND OTHER U.S. TERRITORIES (1898-PRESENT) 43, 48 (2017) (noting that the 
“non-incorporation” doctrine, as applied to Puerto Rico, has “permitted Congress to discrim-
inate in the application of federal social aid programs by either excluding their application 
altogether to Puerto Rico or by applying them to Puerto Rican residents in a discriminatory 
manner”); see also infra Section II.A (discussing the second-class status of Puerto Ricans in 
the United States).  
20. See infra Section II.A (discussing the history of disparate treatment of Puerto Ricans and their 
differential access to certain government services, such as health-care funding). 
21. Robin Respaut, The Disabled in Puerto Rico Fend for Themselves After Decades of U.S. Neglect, 
REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2016, 12:00 PM GMT), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special 
-report/usa-puertorico-disability [https://perma.cc/HZY6-AKYL]. Instead of getting Sup-
plemental Security Income beneﬁts, the disabled in Puerto Rico receive funding from a federal 
program called Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled. See id. According to the Government Ac-
countability Office, this program offers “just 1.3 percent of the money that would be provided 
if Puerto Rico were a state.” Id. 
22. Jenna Johnson & Ashley Parker, Trump Hails ‘Incredible’ Response in ‘Lovely’ Trip to Storm-Torn 
Puerto Rico, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump 
-praises-himself-for-administrations-great-job-in-puerto-rico/2017/10/03/fdb5eeb4-a83a 
-11e7-8ed2-c7114e6ac460_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZA2Z-DBPB]. 
23. See Patricia Mazzei & Agustin Armendariz, FEMA Contract Called for 30 Million Meals for Puerto 
Ricans. 50,000 Were Delivered, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02
/06/us/fema-contract-puerto-rico.html [https://perma.cc/YQ42-J5B9]. 






 months after the hurricanes hit. According to Federal  
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) data, victims of Hurricane Maria in 
Puerto Rico have, on average, received inferior economic assistance compared to 
those affected by most major storms in the United States since 2005.
26
 FEMA aid 
given to Puerto Ricans was typically inferior, in some cases three times as infe-
rior, to aid given to victims of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Sandy, among oth-
ers.
27
 In addition, a study from the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health 
placed the death toll of Hurricane Maria at nearly 5,000
28
—a ﬁgure almost sev-
enty times higher than the Puerto Rican government’s then-official death count 
of sixty-four.
29
 These tragic deaths served as yet another reminder of how down-
playing the United States’ disparate treatment of Puerto Ricans disregards the 
devastating, violent consequences of doing so. 
 
24. See Ana Campoy, Puerto Ricans, Washing in Contaminated Water, Face the Spread of Disease, 
QUARTZ (Oct. 28, 2017), https://qz.com/1114413/hurricane-maria-puerto-ricans-washing-in
-contaminated-water-face-the-spread-of-leptospirosis [https://perma.cc/M2Z7-83RK]; Ed 
Lavandera & John Sutter, Flirting with Another Disaster: Puerto Ricans Tap into Potentially Un-
safe Water, CNN (Oct. 20, 2017, 3:18 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/16/americas
/puerto-rico-superfund-water/index.html [https://perma.cc/B7KF-T9SM]; Mekela Pan-
ditharatne, FEMA Says Most of Puerto Rico Has Potable Water. That Can’t Be True., WASH. POST 
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/fema-says-most-of-puerto-rico 
-has-potable-water-that-cant-be-true/2017/12/21/cf8d8ce0-e511-11e7-a65d-1ac0fd7f09 
7e_story.html [https://perma.cc/744J-72PB]. 
25. See Umair Irfan, Puerto Rico’s Blackout, the Largest in American History, Explained, VOX (May 
8, 2018, 3:27 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2018/2/8/16986408/puerto-rico-blackout 
-power-hurricane [https://perma.cc/6H4B-NFGL]. 
26. See Benjamín Torres Gotay, Ayuda para la isla tras María fue inferior a otros territorios de EE.UU., 
NUEVO DÍA (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/locales/nota/ayudapara 
laislatrasmariafueinferioraotrosterritoriosdeeeuu-2409397 [https://perma.cc/E6PC-NDJD]. 
27. Id. The agency denied roughly sixty percent of 1.2 million applications for FEMA Individual 
and Household grants in Puerto Rico. Adrian Florido, Unable to Prove They Own Their Homes, 
Puerto Ricans Denied FEMA Help, NPR (Mar. 20, 2018 3:47 PM ET), https://www.npr.org
/2018/03/20/595240841/unable-to-prove-they-own-their-homes-puerto-ricans-denied 
-fema-help [https://perma.cc/688P-HNJP]. 
28. Nishant Kishore et al., Mortality in Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
162, 162 (2018). 
29. See Karen Kaplan & Amina Khan, Hurricane Maria’s Death Toll Was 70 Times Higher than 
Puerto Rican Officials Have Reported, Study Says, L.A. TIMES (May 29, 2018, 5:25 PM), http://
www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-hurricane-maria-deaths-20180529-story
.html [https://perma.cc/C3BW-VCHN]. Local residents of Puerto Rico had long been skep-
tical of the government’s official death toll. See Omaya Sosa Pascual, María’s Death Toll in 
Puerto Rico Is Being Underreported, LATINO REBELS (Sept. 28, 2017, 3:04 PM), http://www 
.latinorebels.com/2017/09/28/marias-death-toll-in-puerto-rico-is-being-underreported 
[https://perma.cc/3ADM-NKUW]; Julio Ricardo Varela, Puerto Ricans Knew the Official Hur-
ricane Maria Death Toll Was Fake. We Saw Too Many Dead to Believe It., NBC NEWS: THINK 
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After the hurricanes, some made demands on the federal government to re-
spond to the crisis unfolding on the island. In particular, some Puerto Rican pol-
iticians,
30
 as well as stateside politicians and journalists, invoked Puerto Ricans’ 
status as U.S. citizens to condemn the United States’ neglect of Puerto Rico and 
demand better for “Americans.”
31
 These journalists and politicians engaged in 
rights discourse—the act of invoking rights to secure social change.
32
 Their calls 
for “American” solidarity, however, did little to increase or expedite federal aid 
to Puerto Rico. Despite the fact that Puerto Ricans have a number of formal 
rights through their relationship to the United States, assertion of these rights 
by politicians and journalists did not lead to better treatment in this instance. 
This inefficacy of rights discourse will come as no surprise to Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS) scholars. CLS scholars espouse the critique of rights theory, 
which rejects engaging in rights talk
33
 at all. CLS contends that rights—and the 
legal work done to secure them—operate in very limited spaces that ultimately 
cannot beneﬁt oppressed communities. According to the critique of rights, hav-
ing people mobilize against colonial laws by demanding and articulating their 
rights would ultimately be pointless, as broader power structures limit what 
those rights can secure. 
 
(May 31, 2018, 1:11 PM ET), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/puerto-ricans-knew 
-official-hurricane-maria-death-toll-was-fake-ncna878901 [https://perma.cc/GR7J 
-C7WH]. Several months after the Harvard study was published, the Puerto Rico govern-
ment raised the official Hurricane Maria death toll to 2,975. See Leyla Santiago et al., Puerto 
Rico’s New Hurricane Maria Death Toll Is 46 Times Higher than the Government’s Previous Count, 
CNN (Aug. 28, 2018, 6:25 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/28/health/puerto-rico 
-gw-report-excess-deaths/index.html [https://perma.cc/J3HV-AQC8]. 
30. See Katie Zezima, Puerto Rico Pushes for Statehood, Calling It a Civil Rights Issue, WASH. POST 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/puerto-rico-pushes-for 
-statehood-calling-it-a-civil-rights-issue/2018/06/27/717c5092-7a43-11e8-93cc 
-6d3beccdd7a3_story.html [https://perma.cc/RT4U-X9F7]. 
31. See Frances Negrón-Muntaner, Our Fellow Americans: Why Calling Puerto Ricans “Americans” 
Will Not Save Them, DISSENT (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online 
_articles/our-fellow-americans-puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-colonialism-rhetoric [https://
perma.cc/7DYS-9RR6]. It should be noted that a signiﬁcant number of Americans do not 
realize that Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens. See Kyle Dropp & Brendan Nyhan, Nearly Half of 
Americans Don’t Know Puerto Ricans Are Fellow Citizens, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/upshot/nearly-half-of-americans-dont-know 
-people-in-puerto-ricoans-are-fellow-citizens.html [https://perma.cc/UZ3Q-PG9U]. 
32. For a discussion on rights discourse and the critique of said discourse, see infra Section I.A. 
33. Jennifer Gordon describes “rights talk” as “a phrase that encompasses all the ways people de-
velop their identities in relation to rights” and make claims based on a rights framework. JEN-
NIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 150 (2005). 
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In this Note, I will argue that the CLS critique of rights, though compelling 
in the abstract, falters in the political and historical context of Puerto Rico. Alt-
hough it may appear that rights have failed Puerto Ricans, particularly after the 
hurricanes and the United States’ indefensible response, rights talk has histori-
cally provided a framework for effective organizing and community action. This 
Note counters the CLS intuition that rights talk has no value for Puerto Rico by 
focusing on the origins and development of the Puerto Rico Legal Project, an 
understudied but critical force for community development and legal advocacy 
on the island.
34
 By concentrating on the entitlements that rights are thought to 
provide, the CLS critique of rights ignores the power of rights discourse to or-
ganize marginalized communities. The critique of rights also overlooks the value 
of the collective efforts that go into articulating a particular community’s aspira-
tions through rights talk, efforts that can be empowering and help spur further 
political action.
35
 Further, the critique of rights fails to provide a framework for 
interpreting shifts in political dialogue, such as the changes that occurred be-




I argue in this Note that the critique of rights does not easily map onto Puerto 
Rico because the critique does not account for the role that rights talk can play 
for oppressed colonial communities. Part I provides a background on the critique 
of rights as well as Critical Race Theory (CRT) and LatCrit, the schools of 
thought that ﬁrst responded to its implications. Part II elaborates on Puerto 
Rico’s colonial relationship to the United States to better explain the long history 
of legal and political repression in Puerto Rico. It also draws on original inter-
views with Puerto Rican and U.S. lawyers and community activists to reveal ﬁs-
sures in the critique of rights and to propose certain revisions to the CLS theory. 
Part III then uses the case study of the Project to illustrate how the critique of 
 
34. The Project was active from 1977 to 1982 and inspired decades of public-interest lawyering on 
the island that continues to this day. See infra Sections III.C, IV.A. 
35. As Jennifer Gordon argues, rights education can be used as a “path to collective action” to 
improve individuals’ daily living conditions. GORDON, supra note 33, at 6. “[L]earning about 
rights . . . can galvanize people to see themselves as legitimate actors, those with a right to 
claim rights.” Id. at 7. 
36. Similar protests also took place in May 2018, and they were as, if not more, anticolonial in 
tone as the 2017 protests. See Patricia Mazzei, Protest in Puerto Rico over Austerity Measures Ends 
in Tear Gas, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/us/Puerto 
-rico-protests.html [https://perma.cc/L6QX-GZH]. The protests were met with clashes be-
tween Puerto Ricans and the local police force. See AJ Vicens, After Violent May Day Protests, a 
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rights fails to provide a full account of the relationship between law and organ-
izing in Puerto Rico. Finally, Part IV argues that, contrary to CLS’s predictions, 
civil rights litigation and rights talk have been successful in Puerto Rico. The 
Project and its progeny catalyzed community lawyering on the island and ena-
bled Puerto Ricans to organize their own locally based movements. Instead of 
undermining community organizing, litigation and rights talk galvanized do-
mestic reformers. 
i .  critiquing the critique of rights 
Before delving into the critique of rights and responses to that theory, I will 
provide a brief history of the development of CLS. CLS emerged in the late 
1970s, led by progressive scholars like Mark Tushnet, Peter Gabel, Frances Ol-
sen, and Duncan Kennedy.
37
 CLS denounced U.S. liberalism by injecting Marx-
ian social theory, structuralism, and deconstructive techniques into mainstream 
perceptions of liberal rights consciousness, the objectivity of judicial interpreta-
tion, and other aspects of liberal American legal theory.
38
 CLS argues that the 
law is not neutral, as it tilts in favor of maintaining self-reinforcing structures of 
power and domination. For CLS theorists, the law’s lack of neutrality means that 
rights have no inherent value, particularly because rights, by themselves, do not 
guarantee social change. In this Part, I ﬁrst describe the theory undergirding 
CLS’s rejection of litigation and rights talk. I then describe the two major theo-
retical schools responding to CLS—CRT and LatCrit—and explain how their 
critiques cast doubt on the critique of rights theory. 
A. CLS’s Critique of Rights 
Through the critique of rights, CLS set out to demystify U.S. legal culture’s 
fascination with rights and with legal victories. Mark Tushnet’s seminal articles, 
An Essay on Rights and The Critique of Rights, are representative of CLS’s take on 
rights.
39
 Without discrediting the impulse toward litigation-based strategies, 
Tushnet “caution[s]” lawyers against relying too heavily on legal victories as 
 
37. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, LatCrit Theory: Some Preliminary Notes Towards a Transatlantic Dia-
logue, 9 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2000-2001); Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of 
Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178, 183-90 (Wendy Brown 
& Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
38. See Iglesias, supra note 37, at 9-10. 
39. See Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23 (1993) [hereinafter Tushnet, The 
Critique of Rights]; Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984) [hereinafter 
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights]. 
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sureﬁre methods of contributing to progressive social change.
40
 Tushnet points 
to the persistence of segregation after Brown v. Board of Education
41
 to highlight 
how even successful litigation may result in limited real-world changes.
42
 He 
separates the signiﬁcance of Brown as an ideological victory from its material ef-
fects, focusing on the latter.
43
 Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
school segregation was unconstitutional, Tushnet notes that Brown meant little 
in terms of material change because almost no schools in the South were deseg-
regated in the decade following the legal victory.
44
 On the material front, the 
critique of rights illustrates that the Brown decision left much to be desired. 
Going beyond Brown, Tushnet establishes a taxonomy of the various combi-
nations of legal and political outcomes that can result when communities opt for 
rights-based approaches to social change.
45
 Tushnet argues that sometimes los-
ing a case actually may be better than winning one.
46
 After winning a case, law-
yers might direct less attention and resources to protecting a particular claim.
47
 
Opponents, incensed by the legal victory, might “devote even more energy than 
before to opposing social change.”
48
 Tushnet reasons that courts, facing unre-
lenting pressure from opponents, might subsequently “whittle away” at the prior 
legal victory.
49
 It follows that, in the long run, winning a legal victory might re-
sult in the loss of a political war.
50
 Losing a case can thus be more beneﬁcial to a 
cause because it deters complacency and foments mobilization. For Tushnet, po-




40. Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, supra note 39, at 25. 
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
42. See Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, supra note 39, at 24-25. 
43. See id. at 24; see also id. at 28 (“More generally, ideological victories in court can constitute the 
entry of previously excluded groups into one of the most important forms of discourse in 
United States society, that is, the discourse of rights.”). 
44. See id. at 24. 
45. Tushnet’s taxonomy includes the following four categories: “winning a legal victory and win-
ning politically,” “losing in court but winning politically,” “winning a legal victory but losing 
politically,” and “losing in court and in politics, too.” Id. at 24. 
46. Tushnet calls this “winning by losing.” Id. at 30. 
47. See id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Tushnet calls this “losing by winning.” Id. 
51. Tushnet never makes this assumption explicit in The Critique of Rights, but he does elaborate 
on the importance of mobilization in later works. According to Tushnet, “It’s politics, not ‘the 
Constitution,’ that is the ultimate—and sometimes the proximate—source for whatever pro-
tection we have for our fundamental rights . . . . What the Supreme Court says our rights are 
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Of course, Tushnet recognizes that losing cases can also have adverse effects. 
He states, “[W]hen [a movement’s] claims of rights are rejected, the public may 
think that the claims need not be considered at all; rather than becoming ordi-
nary political claims like any other, the rejected claims of rights simply drop out 
of political consideration.”
52
 But Tushnet argues that this adverse outcome is not 
necessarily always the case.
53
 Where it is the case, however, this outcome rein-
forces the danger of rights talk and litigation under Tushnet’s theory. 
In short, for Tushnet and for CLS more broadly, litigation is likely to under-
mine progressive goals in the long run. This is especially true when litigation is 
successful. The observation about the relative impotence of legal victories ties 
into Tushnet’s broader “indeterminacy thesis.” According to the indeterminacy 
thesis, legal victories cannot replace organizing or other forms of political mobi-
lization; social change depends on the existence and perpetuation of social move-
ments.
54
 Tushnet thus postulates that the codiﬁcation of a particular legal rule 
says nothing about how it should be enforced, which could ultimately work 
against the groups the progressive rule was meant to protect. Put differently, be-
cause rights are indeterminate—meaning that they do not acquire a set meaning 
unless enforced—there is a risk that a legal victory can be applied in a way that 
distorts and erodes the progressive articulation of a right.
55
 With this warning, 




Notably, there are both stronger and weaker formulations of the critique of 
rights. As Tushnet explains, in “its weakest version,” the critique of rights theo-
rizes that “there is no necessary connection between winning legal victories and 
advancing political goals.”
57 
In its stronger formulation, the critique “argues 
that . . . winning legal victories either does not advance political goals or actually 
 
depends in a complicated way on the state of our politics.” MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITU-
TION MATTERS 1, 4 (2010). Tushnet’s vision of mobilization relies on formal political apparat-
uses like the legislature, not necessarily social movements. Id. at 155, 169-72 & n.14. 
52. Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, supra note 39, at 29. 
53. Id. 
54. See id. at 32-34; see also Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 339, 341-45 (1996) (deﬁning the indeterminacy thesis). 
55. See Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, supra note 39, at 33. Tushnet notes, “For example, con-
servatives have used the rhetoric of rights to obstruct progressive regulation of property and—
in a directly related ﬁeld—to challenge campaign ﬁnance regulation on the ground that it vi-
olates free speech rights.” Id. 
56. Id. at 34. 
57. Id. at 23. 




 This Note predominantly responds to the stronger formula-
tion of the critique of rights. Though it is true that legal victories need not nec-
essarily result in political victories, I argue that litigation can and often does ad-
vance political goals. At the very least, the history of litigation in Puerto Rico 
shows that rights talk is in many instances beneﬁcial to oppressed minorities in 
a colonial context. 
B. CRT and LatCrit’s Response to the Critique of Rights 
CRT and LatCrit scholars met the CLS critique of rights with some skepti-
cism, primarily because the theory seemed to erase—or at the very least ignore—
the lived experiences of oppressed groups. CRT, which was heavily inﬂuenced 
by CLS as well as the civil rights movement, acknowledged the potential of the 
CLS critique but did not embrace its vision entirely. CRT scholars instead argued 
for reconstructing, rather than deconstructing,
59
 the relationship between the 
law and racialized power, particularly as it implicated longstanding white-su-
premacist ideology in the United States.
60
 
CRT scholars like Patricia J. Williams and Kimberlé W. Crenshaw visualize 
rights through a very different lens than their CLS peers. Focusing on race and 
racial oppression, Williams and Crenshaw dissect how the critique of rights and 
the proposed alternatives to rights discourse do not comport with the experience 
 
58. Id. 
59. While CLS aimed to disrupt and do away with rights and rights discourse, CRT responded 
by defending the historical value of rights and proposing that, rather than be destroyed, rights 
should be reformed. For instance, Patricia J. Williams argues against the abandonment of 
rights because “rights rhetoric has been and continues to be an effective form of discourse for 
[B]lacks,” and notes, “[t]he vocabulary of rights speaks to an establishment that values the 
guise of stability, and from whom social change for the better must come . . . . The subtlety of 
rights’ real instability thus does not render unusable their persona of stability.” Patricia J. Wil-
liams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 401, 410 (1987). 
60. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893 (dis-
cussing the sources, characteristics, and aspirations of CRT); Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Crit-
ical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 
985, 988 (1990) (arguing that King’s Beloved Community concept “may provide valuable 
insight to those CLS scholars interested in not merely explicating an unjust social order, but 
reconstructing a just community”); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Recon-
struction, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 741, 743 (1994) (“I argue that a tension exists within CRT . . . be-
tween ‘modernist’ and ‘postmodernist’ narratives. The success of what I call a ‘jurisprudence 
of reconstruction’ lies in CRT’s ability to recognize this tension and to use it in ways that are 
creative rather than paralyzing.”). 




 in the United States.
62
 In particular, Williams and Crenshaw take is-
sue with CLS’s suggestion that rights discourse be abandoned for a more infor-
mal, more “pragmatic” articulation of “needs.”
63
 For Williams, rights have been 
useful despite their limits for the political advancement of Black people in the 
United States.
64
 Responding to CLS’s indeterminacy thesis, she explains that the 
fact that rights might be unstable does not rob them of their power to secure 
some stability, especially as applied to the lived experiences of Blacks.
65
 Williams 
counters CLS’s critique of rights by stating that the grimmest chapters of U.S. 
history are a consequence of “a failure of rights-commitment,” not a failure of 
rights-assertion.
66
 Rights are not limited in and of themselves; rather, they are 
products of the restricted universe from which they were conceived. 
Crenshaw, on the other hand, is not as quick to discredit the critique of 
rights, but she ultimately posits that the critique is incomplete because it does 
 
61. Though “Black” as a racial category tends to appear in lowercase in most mainstream writing, 
I will capitalize the word as a reference to it not only being a proper name, but a reference to 
a cultural, ethnic, and diasporic group. This choice further emulates the stylistic choice of 
CRT scholars like Crenshaw, whose work is crucial to this Note. See, e.g., Lori L. Tharps, The 
Case for Black With a Capital B, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014
/11/19/opinion/the-case-for-black-with-a-capital-b.html [https://perma.cc/F2LX-QHJU]. 
62. Williams best encapsulates this point of view in the following quote: 
For [B]lacks, therefore, the battle is not deconstructing rights, in a world of no 
rights; nor of constructing statements of need, in a world of abundantly apparent 
need. Rather, the goal is to ﬁnd a political mechanism that can confront the denial 
of need. The argument that rights are disutile, even harmful, trivializes this aspect 
of [B]lack experience speciﬁcally, as well as that of any person or group whose gen-
uine vulnerability has been protected by that measure of actual entitlement which 
rights provide. 
Williams, supra note 59, at 413. 
63. Compare Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1364-66 (1988) (critiquing 
Tushnet’s pragmatism), and Williams, supra note 59, at 412-13 (opposing CLS’s focus on 
needs instead of rights), with Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, supra note 39, at 1391 (“But there do 
seem to be substantial pragmatic reasons to think that abandoning the rhetoric of rights 
would be the better course to pursue for now. People need food and shelter now, and demand-
ing that those needs be satisﬁed—whether or not satisfying them can today persuasively be 
characterized as enforcing a right—strikes me as more likely to succeed than claiming that 
existing rights to food and shelter must be enforced.”).  
64. Williams, supra note 59, at 410. 
65. Id. at 409-10. This stability is also part of an internal process. Williams states, “[T]he experi-
ence of rights-assertion has been one of both solidarity and freedom, of empowerment of an 
internal and very personal sort; it has been a process of ﬁnding the self.” Id. at 414. I will 
discuss the signiﬁcance of such a process in Part IV. 
66. Id. at 424. 
the yale law journal 128:792  2019 
806 
not tackle racial domination. Crenshaw recognizes that engaging in rights dis-
course has allowed conservatives to deradicalize and co-opt challenges to op-
pressive paradigms.
67
 She reminds critics, however, that, in a world that circum-
scribes Blacks as “other,” it is unlikely that Black people’s calls for inclusion and 




Crenshaw refutes CLS’s dismissive take on rights, asserting that Blacks’ lim-
ited options in this sphere are a direct consequence of the “ideological power of 
white race consciousness” and the siloing of their interests and experiences from 
American society.
69
 Citing the work of Antonio Gramsci and Roberto Unger, 
Crenshaw argues that liberalism offers “transformative potential” because it af-
fords Black people an opportunity not only to articulate their aspirations, but 
also combat the oppression they face.
70
 She notes that, in the context of white 
supremacy, “[a]ttempts to harness the power of the state through the appropri-
ate rhetorical/legal incantations should be appreciated as . . . calculated political 
acts” and “act[s] of self-defense.”
71
 
In a similar vein, “LatCrit theory responds to the invisibility of [Latinxs] in 
North American law and society despite [their] longstanding presence within 
the lands now known as the United States.”
72
 Fittingly, LatCrit was conceived at 
a 1995 colloquium held in Puerto Rico addressing the relationship between CRT 
and Latinx communities.
73
 It subsequently evolved and now stands as a network 
 
67. Crenshaw, supra note 63, at 138. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1357, 1386-87. 
71. Id. at 1382; see also id. at 1336 n.19 (“[W]hite supremacy is used to refer to a formal system of 
racial domination based on the explicit belief that Blacks are inferior and should be subordi-
nated.”); id. at 1336 n.20 (“[A] society once expressly organized around white supremacist 
principles does not cease to be a white supremacist society simply by formally rejecting those 
principles. The society remains white supremacist in its maintenance of the actual distribution 
of goods and resources, status, and prestige in which whites establish norms which are ideo-
logically self-reﬂective. The phenomenon is ideological because it is a fantasy, because it is not 
real.”). 
72. Francisco Valdes, Barely at the Margins: Race and Ethnicity in Legal Education—A Curricular 
Study with LatCritical Commentary, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 119, 120-21 (2002) (discussing the lack of 
Latinxs in U.S. law school curricula and how to use LatCrit in curricular reform). 
73. See id. at 120 n.3. 
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LatCrit adds a particularly salient layer to this discussion by taking issue with 
the U.S. civil rights paradigm.
76
 
Contrary to CLS’s skepticism of the value of rights, LatCrit disputes how 
substantive rights are framed or articulated in the United States, not the rights 
paradigm as a whole. LatCrit theory criticizes the U.S. civil rights paradigm for 
solely focusing on domestic or mainland issues
77
 and ignores how U.S. policy 
perpetuates injustices against designated “alien[s]”
78
 as well as people living un-
der twenty-ﬁrst-century colonialism in U.S. territories.
79
 In addition, LatCrit 
questions the U.S. civil rights paradigm’s tendency to essentialize issues of sub-
ordination into a Black/white binary of race and race relations. LatCrit compli-
cates the Black/white binary of racial subordination in the United States by cat-
 
74. Anti-essentialism is a term that is generally associated with feminist legal theory, but its ra-
tionale has been applied to other oppressed groups. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism 
and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16, 19 
(1995). Anti-essentialists oppose the view that, for instance, “all women share the same in-
herent characteristics” and “challenge the use of ﬁxed characteristics, such as biology and psy-
chology, in deﬁning women.” Jane Wong, The Anti-Essentialism v. Essentialism Debate in Fem-
inist Legal Theory: The Debate and Beyond, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 275 (1999). Anti-
essentialism thus “seeks to reveal intragroup differences . . . to expose relations of subordina-
tion and domination that may exist within and among the members of any particular group.” 
Iglesias, supra note 37, at 3 n.5. 
75. As a general matter, antisubordination is concerned with eradicating socially constructed hi-
erarchies. See Bell, supra note 60, at 900-01; see also Crenshaw, supra note 63, at 1370-76 (de-
scribing the subordination of Black people in the United States); Francisco Valdes, LatCrit 
2013 Conference Symposium Afterword: Theorizing and Building Critical Coalitions: Outsider So-
ciety and Academic Praxis in Local/Global Justice Struggles, 12 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 983, 1013 
(2014) (“Standing in contrast to the antidiscrimination principle of the 1960s that produced 
the formal equality status quo, the anti-subordination perspective focuses speciﬁcally on so-
cial results and material realities; moving beyond the limits of formally equal ‘opportunity’ 
without regards to actual social change, the anti-subordination principle measures the efficacy 
of equality policy speciﬁcally by reference to actual social progress.”). 
76. See Iglesias, supra note 37, at 15-16. 
77. Id. at 15-17. 
78. Id.; see Elvia R. Arriola, LatCrit Theory, International Human Rights, Popular Culture, and the 
Faces of Despair in INS Raids, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 245 (1996-1997); Kevin R. John-
son, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 
28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263 (1996-1997). 
79. See generally Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 1 (2000) (discussing how Puerto Rico’s colonial status is inconsistent with both contem-
porary law and theories of justice and morality). 
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egorizing communities along indigenous, ethnic, and multiracial lines.
80
 Al-
though these two focal points differ in subject, they point to LatCrit’s broader 
critique of structural power and how it operates against the interests of op-
pressed communities. 
By looking beyond the conﬁnes of the United States, LatCrit theorists are 
able to expose the critique of rights’ inapplicability to people and nations outside 
the U.S. mainland. Similar to CRT, LatCrit advises against importing the more 
radical implications of the CLS rights critique (e.g., dissociating from litigation 
and rights-based strategies altogether), particularly in contexts where the “rule 
of law” is not a dominant, or even cultivated, ideology.
81
 LatCrit looks to the 
histories of countries like Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, and Haiti to 
counter notions that “the wholesale deconstruction and delegitimation of rule of 
law ideologies” will liberate the oppressed.
82
 In particular, Elizabeth Iglesias pos-
its that the “continuing instances of gross human rights abuses, impunity, and 
corruption” in those countries reveal the potential consequences of abrogating 
rule of law ideologies.
83
 In highlighting these tensions, Iglesias argues that alt-
hough law alone is not enough to change existing power structures, any liberat-
ing movement “must seek to render power at least minimally accountable, and 
to do so, it will need law, and more speciﬁcally, it will need rights.”
84
 This Note’s 
historical discussion of the Puerto Rico Legal Project offers one example of Igle-
sias’s argument. 
Although Tushnet’s take is modest in tone, the critique of rights compels 
lawyers to reexamine the capacity of litigation for social change when rights-
centric work is so often plagued by consequences that are actually counterpro-
ductive to achieving progressive goals. Recent scholarship on the critique of 
rights tends to agree with Tushnet, noting that rights discourse “presents itself 
as a means of achieving social justice while at the same time legitimating and 
 
80. See Iglesias, supra note 37, at 17; see also Robert S. Chang, The Nativist’s Dream of Return, 9 LA 
RAZA L.J. 55 (1996) (commenting on the marginalization of Asian Americans and Latinos due 
to the Black/white racial paradigm in the United States); Rachel F. Moran, Neither Black nor 
White, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 61, 68-69 (1997) (arguing that Latinx Americans’ limited suc-
cess in upward mobility was in part a product of the Black/white model of race relations); 
Francisco Valdes, Foreword: Latina/o Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics 
in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 5-6 (1996) (arguing 
that CRT works have left some important racial intersections unexplored). 
81. See Iglesias, supra note 37, at 17-18. 
82. Id. at 18. 
83. Id. at 17-18. 
84. Id. at 18. 
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perpetuating the status quo.”
85
 The critique of rights, however, tends to deﬁne 
these progressive goals in myopic terms. Even Roberto Unger, himself a CLS 
proponent, recognizes the limits of CLS. Unger has contended that “[CLS] 
largely failed in its most important task: to turn legal thought into a source of 
insight into the established institutional and ideological structure of society and 
into a source of ideas about alternative social regimes.”
86
 Unger saw this CLS 
failure in the inability to reestablish any sort of “consensus in legal theory and 
method.”
87
 At the time, CLS disrupted the consensus in legal thought, but per-
haps inadvertently portrayed similar approaches to the law, or matching views 
on the law’s role in social change, as being diametrically opposed.
88
 
I contend that the history of rights discourse in Puerto Rico supports the 
arguments of CRT and LatCrit scholars, who recognize that the critique of rights 
needs some modiﬁcations. The CRT and LatCrit literature provides some help-
ful frameworks for better understanding the limits of the critique of rights. As 
prior scholars have explained, the critique of rights ignores the role that rights 
or rights talk can play in the lives of people of color and other marginalized 
groups.
89
 This Note argues that the critique of rights addresses neither how 
rights talk can assist in mobilizing marginalized communities, nor how rights 
can be reconstructed to secure protection from repressive government forces.
90
 
These considerations will be at the forefront of our analysis when discussing 
rights in the colonized nation of Puerto Rico. 
The Project and its progeny, contrary to what the critique of rights would 
predict, enabled Puerto Ricans to imagine and ﬁght for alternatives to their co-
lonial reality. But in order to appreciate that development, we must ﬁrst under-
stand the history of legal and political repression in Puerto Rico, and how it has 
deﬁned rights discourse on the island. As the next Part will show, the conception 
of rights in Puerto Rico depends on—and is necessarily limited by—the colonial 
and racial context that ﬁrst brought these rights to life. 
 
85. Jennifer Hendry & Melissa L. Tatum, Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples, and the Pursuit of Jus-
tice, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 357 (2016); see also Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon 
and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176. 2190-98 (2013) (explaining how Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), demonstrates that rights are indeterminate and regressive). 
86. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT: ANOTHER TIME, A 
GREATER TASK 32 (2015). 
87. Id. at 32, 42. 
88. Id. at 42. 
89. See Iglesias, supra note 37, at 17-18; Williams, supra note 59, at 413. 
90. See infra Parts III, IV. 
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i i .  puerto rico’s colonial status under the u.s.  legal 
system 
In this Part, I will build on the LatCrit observation that the critique of rights 
overlooks the unique needs of colonized people.
91
 I will ﬁrst give an overview of 
the United States’ colonization of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Supreme Court’s role 
in not only legitimizing that process, but also codifying Puerto Ricans’ status as 
colonial subjects. I will then recount the long history of both local- and federal-
government repression of pro-independence thought and political activity on 
the island. 
A. Puerto Ricans, (Second-Class) U.S. Citizens 
Although Puerto Ricans
92
 have been U.S. citizens since 1917 due to the Jones 
Act,
93
 “they do not have full legal, political, and cultural citizenship rights.”
94
 
Puerto Ricans cannot vote for the U.S. President in the general election (though 
they can participate in presidential primaries),
95
 have no voting power in Con-
gress,
96
 and receive much less health-care funding than the states.
97
 These legal 
 
91. See Malavet, supra note 79. 
92. Because the term “Puerto Rican” also refers to a diasporic group, I will note that, when I refer 
to Puerto Ricans throughout this Note, I mean those who were born and continue to reside 
in Puerto Rico. Becoming part of the diaspora by moving to the mainland United States re-
moves many of the legal burdens on voting and access to government services described in 
this Section. 
93. Jones-Shafroth Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917). 
94. See PEDRO A. MALAVET, AMERICA’S COLONY: THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONFLICT BE-
TWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO 22 (2004). 
95. See Kenya Downs, Puerto Rican Voter Surge in Florida Is No Surprise, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 
8, 2016, 8:51 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/is-puerto-ricans-movement-to 
-mainland-swaying-elections [https://perma.cc/BG32-G4AW]. 
96. Puerto Rico has a nonvoting member in the House of Representatives, a resident commis-
sioner who is essentially a congressional lobbyist for the island’s interests in Washington, 
D.C. While the commissioner can vote in committee on bills and has the power to introduce 
legislation, the commissioner cannot participate in ﬂoor votes. See Delegates and Resident Com-
missioners, KIDS HOUSE (Nov. 9, 2018, 11:10 AM), https://kids-clerk.house.gov/high-school 
/lesson.html?intID=36 [https://perma.cc/8AZM-9NEY]. 
97. On average, the federal government covers 57% of state Medicaid programs. Due to a cap on 
total Medicaid funding for U.S. territories (whose residents do not pay federal income taxes), 
the federal government only pays for 15% to 20% of Puerto Rico’s Medicaid programs. Almost 
half of the island’s population participates in Medicaid. See Paige Winﬁeld Cunningham, The 
Health 202: Puerto Rico’s Problems Include a Medicaid Shortfall, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2017/10/04
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and political deﬁciencies have consequently legitimized social and cultural mark-




A history of colonialism undergirds the second-class status of Puerto Ricans. 
In 1898, the United States invaded and seized the island from Spain, which had 
ruled Puerto Rico since 1493. A U.S.-appointed civilian government then con-
trolled the island from 1900 until 1917, when it was replaced by the Jones Act.
99
 
At the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Insular Cases, a series of 
opinions regarding the status of U.S. territories acquired in the Spanish-Ameri-
can War.
100
 It should be noted that many of the Justices who decided the ﬁrst of 
these cases, Downes v. Bidwell,
101
 were the same Justices who upheld the segre-
gationist “separate but equal” doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson.
102
 That same 





cea81d2d [https://perma.cc/8YKC-MQCV]; see also Vann R. Newkirk II, The Historical Ex-
clusion Behind the Puerto Rico Bankruptcy Crisis, ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), https://www 
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/medicaid-funding-cap-puerto-rico/524973 
[https://perma.cc/S6Y4-V5JK] (arguing that Congress could help Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy 
crisis by funding the island’s Medicaid system the way it funds the states’ Medicaid systems); 
Vann R. Newkirk II, What Health Reform Means to the American Territories, ATLANTIC (Aug. 
26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/what-health-reform 
-means-to-the-american-territories/538056/ [https://perma.cc/RK2E-NQEJ] (explaining 
that U.S. territories are seldom considered in the calculus of national health-policy decisions). 
98. LatCrit scholar Pedro A. Malavet contends that this partly has to do with how Puerto Ricans 
have been constructed as “foreigners” despite their legal citizenship. MALAVET, supra note 94, 
at 22. Malavet suggests that, in this manner, the United States has legally racialized Puerto 
Ricans as nonwhite to further marginalize them. See id. at 23. 
99. See id. at 37; see also Jones-Shafroth Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, 145 Stat. 951 (1917) (changing 
the legal regime). The Foraker Act of 1900, which established the initial regime that was re-
placed by the Jones Act, also created the Federal District Court of the United States for Puerto 
Rico. See MALAVET, supra note 94, at 37. 
100. Some scholars argue that there are only nine Insular Cases, decided by the Supreme Court in 
1901-1902. See id. at 38. Others contend that the cases cover a much broader period, starting 
with Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, which they argue “created the imperial United States with its inherent 
constructs of citizens and noncitizens within U.S. territorial control,” and ending with Balzac 
v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). See MALAVET, supra note 94, at 38. 
101. 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
102. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Only one Justice was replaced between the two decisions. 
103. See, e.g., Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 57, 68 (2013) (“The rules established in the Insular Cases were simply a more stringent 
version of the Plessy doctrine: the newly conquered lands were to be treated not only sepa-
rately, but also unequally.”); Doug Mack, The Strange Case of Puerto Rico: How a Series of Racist 
Supreme Court Decisions Cemented the Island’s Second-Class Status, SLATE (Oct. 9, 2017, 5:45 
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Downes is crucial to understanding the current state of U.S. citizenship in 
Puerto Rico.
104
 In Downes, the Court considered whether the U.S. Constitution 
applied to Puerto Rico. The Court held that the Constitution did not fully apply 
to U.S. territories because they were not incorporated, and it was up to Congress 
to decide when or whether to incorporate them.
105
 This rule inspired a cryptic 
line from Justice White, who stated that even though Puerto Rico was “not a 
foreign country, . . . it was foreign to the United States in a domestic sense.”
106
 
The Court justiﬁed the existence of a territory that is simultaneously foreign and 
domestic by reasoning that, because Puerto Rico and the other territories 
“[were] inhabited by alien races,” governing them “according to Anglo-Saxon 
principles, [might] for a time be impossible.”
107
 The decision codiﬁed Puerto 
Ricans’ status as unincorporated “others” living under the rule, but not the pro-
tection, of the United States and its Constitution. Despite the racism underlying 
Downes and the cases that followed,
108
 they remain good law. 
The racist reasoning behind the Insular Cases also inﬂuenced the very legis-
lation that granted Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship, the Jones Act.
109




/8ZYY-GWGK] (recounting the history and legacy of the Insular Cases); Rose Cuison Villa-
zor, The Insular Cases Are a Cautionary Tale in the Citizenship Debate, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR 
DEBATE (Dec. 22, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/08/24
/should-birthright-citizenship-be-abolished/the-insular-cases-are-a-cautionary-tale-in 
-the-citizenship-debate [https://perma.cc/KC6U-SD97] (arguing that the Insular Cases 
perpetuated inequality on the basis of racist premises). 
104. Recent scholarship suggests that Downes, though still a critical case on this question, should 
be read in conjunction with Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904), to fully understand the 
Insular Cases’ evolution. For further reading on this topic, see Sam Erman, Citizens of Empire: 
Puerto Rico, Status, and Constitutional Change, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1181, 1234-40 (2014). 
105. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 339 (White, J., concurring) (“[I]ncorporation does not arise until in 
the wisdom of Congress it is deemed that the acquired territory has reached that state where 
it is proper that it should enter into and form a part of the American family.”). 
106. Id. at 341. For a deconstruction of this phrase and takes on American imperialism vis-à-vis the 
U.S. territories, see generally FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EX-
PANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001). 
107. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287. 
108. The last of the Insular Cases, Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), reiterated the notion of 
second-class citizenship for U.S. territories that Downes ﬁrst articulated. The case held that 
only fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause would apply to U.S. citizens 
living in the territories, but personal freedoms (like the right to a trial by jury and the right to 
uniform taxation) would not. Balzac thus “constitutionally constructs the United States citi-
zenship of Puerto Ricans as second class, as long as they remain on the territory of Puerto 
Rico.” Malavet, supra note 79, at 30.  
109. Jones-Shafroth Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, 145 Stat. 951 (1917). 
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congressional debate on the Act, U.S. Representative Joseph Cannon proclaimed 
that “the racial question” made Puerto Ricans unsuitable for statehood, and 
openly debated whether they were “people competent for self-government.”
110
 
Cannon’s crude testimony aligned squarely with the reasoning and language of 
the Supreme Court’s Insular Cases: the assimilation of “alien,” “mixed race,” or 
“African” Puerto Ricans was not only impossible; it was normatively undesira-
ble. The last of the Insular Cases, Balzac v. Porto Rico,
111
 qualiﬁed the citizenship 
afforded to Puerto Ricans through the Act by specifying that not all constitu-
tional protections applied to Puerto Rico.
112
 Curiously, the U.S. Supreme Court 
rationalized this form of second-class citizenship by distinguishing Alaska, 
which was settled “by American citizens,”
113
 from the “difficulties”
114
 of incor-
porating the Philippines and Puerto Rico into the Union.
115
 The origins of U.S. 
citizenship of Puerto Ricans reveal that any analysis of rights in Puerto Rico can-
not be divorced from ideas of racial domination as a general matter and coloni-
alism in particular, as the next Section will demonstrate. 
B. Repression on the Island 
As the century wore on, many Puerto Ricans grew disaffected with U.S. rule. 
Generally speaking, accounts of this era in Puerto Rico tend to focus on demo-




110. The congressman then presented “statistical” analysis claiming that “Porto Rico is populated 
by a mixed race . . . [which is a]bout 30 per cent pure African . . . . [And] 75 to 80 percent of 
the population . . . was pure African or had an African strain in their blood.” Malavet, supra 
note 79, at 52 n.221 (citations omitted); see also RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR 
A DIVERSE AMERICA 346 (Juan F. Perea et al. eds., 2000) (summarizing Cannon’s racial argu-
ment). Congress did not get the island’s name right until 1932, when it changed the incorrect 
“Porto Rico” used in statutes and judicial opinions to “Puerto Rico.” Malavet, supra note 79, 
at 32; see also 48 U.S.C. § 731 (2018). 
111. 258 U.S. 298. 
112. See id. at 304-09 (holding that the Jones Act did not apply the entirety of the Federal Bill of 
Rights to Puerto Rico); Malavet, supra note 79, at 29. 
113. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 309. 
114. Id. 
115. See Malavet, supra note 79, at 30-31. 
116. See e.g., A.W. MALDONADO, LUIS MUÑOZ MARÍN: PUERTO RICO’S DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 
270-71, 421-23 (2006); Joanne Omang, Luis Munoz Marin, 4-Term Governor of Puerto Rico, Dies, 
WASH. POST (May 1, 1980), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1980/05/01
/luis-munoz-marin-4-term-governor-of-puerto-rico-dies/06ecd114-edb1-4908-98ab 
-4de668ee3f2d [https://perma.cc/8EXH-3D4H ]. Until 1948, the United States appointed all 
governors that ruled over Puerto Rico. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 
the yale law journal 128:792  2019 
814 
growth on the island,
117
 and the adoption of the Constitution of the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico in 1952.
118
 However, the twentieth century is also signiﬁ-
cant for being a time of cultural indoctrination, political control, and violent re-




Black/Afro-Latinx lawyer and politician Pedro Albizu Campos,
120
 who pre-
sided over the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party from 1930 until his death in 
1965,
121
 was the face of a small but growing independentista sentiment on the 
island. In 1936, Albizu Campos was imprisoned on conspiracy and sedition 
charges after leading a successful island-wide agricultural strike in 1934.
122
 In 
response, peaceful protests organized across Puerto Rico, the most notable of 
which occurred in Ponce, on March 21, 1937, on Palm Sunday.
123
 After a shot of 
“undetermined origin,”
124
 police ﬁred into a crowd of pro-independence Puerto 
 
(2016). All of these governors, except for native Puerto Rican Jesús T. Piñero, were American. 
See Piñero, Jesús T., HIST., ART & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, https://history
.house.gov/People/Detail/19726 [https://perma.cc/3ALF-9UTN]. 
117. See AYALA & BERNABE, supra note 10, at 179-200 (explaining Puerto Rico’s postwar economic 
transformation). 
118. See id. at 162-78 (describing the background for the adoption of Puerto Rico’s Constitution). 
119. See Malavet, supra note 79, at 71-74. 
120. Albizu Campos was the ﬁrst Puerto Rican to graduate from Harvard College and the ﬁrst 
Puerto Rican to graduate from Harvard Law School. See NELSON A. DENIS, WAR AGAINST ALL 
PUERTO RICANS: REVOLUTION AND TERROR IN AMERICA’S COLONY 26, 153, 155 (2015). He was 
class valedictorian at Harvard Law School. Id. at 57. His professors, however, delayed two of 
his exams so he would not graduate on time in an effort to avoid the “embarrassment” of 
having a Puerto Rican valedictorian. See MARISA ROSADO, LAS LLAMAS DE LA AURORA: ACERCA-
MIENTO A UNA BIOGRAFÍA DE PEDRO ALBIZU CAMPOS 50-52 (1998). 
121. See War Against All Puerto Ricans: Inside the U.S. Crackdown on Pedro Albizu Campos & Nation-
alist Party, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 21, 2015) [hereinafter War Against All Puerto Ricans], 
https://www.democracynow.org/2015/4/21/war_against_all_puerto_ricans_inside 
[https://perma.cc/HLN7-PQ39]. 
122. See Albizu v. United States, 88 F.2d 138, 139-40 (1st Cir. 1937); AJ Vicens, The Lost History of 
Puerto Rico’s Independence Movement, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 21, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www
.motherjones.com/media/2015/04/puerto-rico-independence-albizu-campos [https://
perma.cc/7EDN-8T68]; War Against All Puerto Ricans, supra note 121. It is also worth noting 
that J. Edgar Hoover sent FBI agents to surveil the Nationalist leadership after the strike. See 
DENIS, supra note 120, at 64. 
123. See War Against All Puerto Ricans, supra note 121. 
124. Malavet, supra note 79, at 71 n.325. 
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Ricans, killing twenty-one and wounding over two hundred.
125
 The event be-
came known as the Ponce Massacre.
126
 
The United States was not the sole perpetrator of these violent tactics. Puerto 
Rican political elites and law enforcement also used the island’s colonial relation-
ship to the United States to quell dissent. Governor Muñoz Marín and the Puerto 
Rican legislature approved Public Law 53, known as “la Ley de la Mordaza” (“the 
Gag Law”), in 1948, which made it a felony to advocate the overthrowing of the 
insular government.
127
 The Gag Law criminalized speaking in favor of Puerto 
Rican independence, organizing groups or assemblies of people for that purpose, 
owning or displaying a Puerto Rican ﬂag, and even singing “La Borinqueña,” the 
island’s national anthem.
128
 This law proved especially useful after Nationalist 
Party uprisings took hold of the island on October 30, 1950.
129
 That day, Muñoz 
Marín called in the Puerto Rico National Guard and bombed the two towns 
where the armed revolts were the most intense, Jayuya and Utuado, and the na-
tionalists surrendered.
130
 Albizu Campos was among the arrestees. He spent 
most of the rest of his life in prison, where he was subjected to inhumane living 
conditions, torture, and radiation experiments.
131
 
The government repression in Puerto Rico did not end with a bomb. From 
1936 to 1995, the FBI tracked thousands of independentistas, keeping secret ﬁles 
 
125. See War Against All Puerto Ricans, supra note 121. 
126. See MALAVET, supra note 94, at 91. 
127. See Nelson A. Denis, How Luis Muñoz Marín (and His Addiction to Opium) Enslaved Puerto 
Rico, LATINO REBELS (Feb. 24, 2015, 3:36 PM), http://www.latinorebels.com/2015/02/24
/how-luis-munoz-marin-and-his-addiction-to-opium-enslaved-puerto-rico [https://perma
.cc/3WLX-UYVL]; Marisol LeBrón, Puerto Rico and the Colonial Circuits of Policing, NACLA 
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://nacla.org/news/2017/09/27/puerto-rico-and-colonial-circuits 
-policing [https://perma.cc/J5YJ-N3TD] (“La Mordaza was adapted from parts of the U.S. 
Alien Registration Act of 1940, or the Smith Act, a wartime measure to prevent domestic acts 
of sabotage and subversion through targeting communist and anarchist organizers, and re-
mained in effect until 1957.”). 
128. See Ivonne Acosta-Lespier, The Smith Act Goes to San Juan: La Mordaza, 1948-1957, in PUERTO 
RICO UNDER COLONIAL RULE 59, 59 (Ramón Bosque-Pérez & José Javier Colón Morera eds., 
2006); LeBrón, supra note 127. 
129. See MALAVET, supra note 94, at 92-93. 
130. About twenty-ﬁve people were killed and between one and two thousand people were arrested 
after the failed insurrection. See Juan González, Puerto Rico Marks 60th Anniversary of Jayuya 
Uprising, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.democracynow.org/2010/10/29
/puerto_rico_marks_60th_anniversary_of [https://perma.cc/7TED-MUR9]; War Against 
All Puerto Ricans, supra note 121. 
131. See DENIS, supra note 120, at 320, 324-26; War Against All Puerto Ricans, supra note 121. 
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on their every move.
132
 This joint effort between the Bureau and the Puerto Rico 
Police Department produced almost two million pages of surveillance docu-
ments that provided information about independentista political activity, stu-
dent demonstrations, and worker strikes.
133
 The dossiers, known as “carpetas” in 
Spanish, were routinely used to blacklist and discredit independentistas, their 
sympathizers, and other ordinary Puerto Ricans.
134
 In addition, the Puerto Rican 
labor movement, whose striking activity peaked in the early 1970s,
135
 was seri-
ously weakened by cases brought before the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB).
136
 The struggle of the Cementworkers Union against Puerto Rican Ce-
ment Company, owned by former pro-statehood Puerto Rican governor and 
multimillionaire Luis A. Ferré, is instructive.
137
 In January 1975, after the union’s 
contract with Puerto Rican Cement expired, the company suspended sick pay 
and pay to disabled workers, tried to cut retired workers’ pension payments, and 
wanted to cut worker’s health-insurance plans.
138
 On January 31, 1975, the union 
went on strike, but the company refused to negotiate with its workers, instead 
hiring strikebreakers, creating an anti-union media campaign, and bringing 
criminal charges against more than thirty union members.
139
 In what some con-
sidered to be a politically motivated move, the NLRB allegedly engaged in pro-
cedural delays, undermining the union’s case against Puerto Rican Cement and 
 
132. Debbie Nathan, X-Rays or X-Files? The FBI and the Independentistas, NACLA (Sept. 25, 2007), 
https://nacla.org/article/x-rays-or-x-ﬁles-fbi-and-independentistas [https://perma.cc/E56P
-DA46]; Mireya Navarro, New Light on Old F.B.I. Fight; Decades of Surveillance of Puerto Rican 
Groups, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/28/nyregion/new 
-light-on-old-fbi-ﬁght-decades-of-surveillance-of-puerto-rican-groups.html [https://
perma.cc/QA7C-AWS9]. 
133. Navarro, supra note 132. 
134. See id. In an interview, Judith Berkan stated that the Puerto Rico Police Department’s Intelli-
gence Unit would use information from the carpeteo process to discourage schools from ad-
mitting students and employers from hiring “communists.” The Inter-American University, 
a private university where Berkan still teaches, had a dean who acknowledged that the police 
had to approve those who were being admitted to the school. Telephone Interview with Judith 
Berkan (Nov. 10, 2017). 
135. See AYALA & BERNABE, supra note 10, at 233. 
136. See Telephone Interview with Paul Schachter (Nov. 17, 2017); NLRB—A Repressive Tool, FREE-
DOM ARCHIVES (1976), https://www.freedomarchives.org/Documents/Finder/DOC512
_scans/512.PR.NLRB.web.pdf [https://perma.cc/46PZ-T6N7]. 
137. See AYALA & BERNABE, supra note 10, at 233; see also Luis A. Ferre, 99; Ex-Governor Sought Puerto 
Rico Statehood, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/oct/22/local/me 
-ferre22 [https://perma.cc/58SX-EEVJ] (describing Ferré’s business and political activities). 
138. See NLRB—A Repressive Tool, supra note 136. 
139. Id. 
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forcing an end to the strike.
140
 It was in this context of acute and evolving polit-
ical repression that the Puerto Rico Legal Project was born. 
i i i .  the advent of civil  rights litigation in puerto rico 
To illustrate how the evolution of rights talk in Puerto Rico diverges from 
the CLS critique of rights, this Part tells the story of the Project. Here, I draw 
from original interviews with Puerto Rican and U.S. lawyers and community 
activists to describe the signiﬁcance of the Project’s rights-based approach to so-
cial change, and how the Project inspired generations of Puerto Ricans to engage 
in nation-building work. 
A. Keeping Movements Alive 
The Project emerged from conversations between independentista labor 
leaders and U.S.-based attorneys involved with the Center for Constitutional 
Rights (CCR) in New York City. In the early 1970s, Pedro Grant, union leader 
and head of the Movimiento Obrero Unido (MOU),
141
 and other Puerto Rican 
labor leaders contacted CCR to help fend off the assaults being made against the 
island’s ﬂedgling independentista labor movement.
142
 CCR then put them in 
touch with David Scribner, a “patriarch” of the labor and civil rights movements, 




140. It took the NLRB three months to decide whether the union had a case against the company, 
in contrast to the NLRB’s typical time period of one month. After the NLRB rejected the 
union’s charges against the company, the union appealed, but the NLRB did not decide 
whether a hearing regarding the company’s alleged unfair labor practices should be held for 
another six months. On December 15, 1975, the NLRB once again decided against the union. 
During the six-month delay, the NLRB also held up elections that would have decided 
whether the Cementworkers Union had a right to represent the company’s workers. Typically, 
elections are held even if an appeal is pending. Id. 
141. Spanish for “United Labor Movement,” the Movimiento Obrero Unido was a coalition of pro-
gressive labor movements in Puerto Rico. See Telephone Interview with Paul Schachter, supra 
note 136; Reconocen aportaciones de Pedro Grant al sindicalismo, NOTICEL (Mar. 4, 2012, 10:06 
AM), http://www.noticel.com/ahora/reconocen-aportaciones-de-pedro-grant-al 
-sindicalismo/608067951 [https://perma.cc/JP2H-MBCG]. 
142. See Telephone Interview with Paul Schachter, supra note 136. 
143. Id.; see Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, Distinguished Lecturer, CUNY School of 
Law (Mar. 30, 2018). Scribner was perhaps best known for being the general counsel of the 
United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America during the 1940s and 1950s. He 
was also part of the defense team that represented the Scottsboro Boys, and was a founder of 
the National Lawyers Guild. See Glenn Fowler, David Scribner, 84, Lawyer for Unions and in 
Rights Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/13/obituaries
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Grant and the other leaders met with Scribner and told him that they were 
essentially “under attack by the big corporations.”
144
 Labor was vulnerable to 
these attacks for two reasons. First, because of their nationalist orientation, the 
labor leaders did not want to recognize the jurisdiction of the United States over 
the labor movement in Puerto Rico.
145
 Refusing to acknowledge the United 
States’ jurisdiction over Puerto Rico was certainly a powerful way to protest co-
lonialism, as well as to challenge people’s notions of authority. For years, pro-
gressive and independentista lawyers followed the anticolonial principle that one 
could not use the instrumentalities of the colonial power, and thus refused to 
recognize the federal courts in Puerto Rico.
146
 For them, Puerto Rico’s problems 
could not be solved until imperialism was defeated.
147
 Some lawyers even re-
fused to learn federal law, and instead went to law school in Puerto Rico and 
focused on learning the island’s civil code system.
148
 
Second, repressive cases against Puerto Rican workers were being brought 
through the NLRB, which meant that, to challenge administrative decisions, you 
had to go into federal court.
149
 Many of the unions’ members spoke no English, 
and their lawyers did not have experience in federal court, which disadvantaged 
them greatly.
150
 Additionally, grand juries were used to investigate the Puerto 




144. Telephone Interview with Paul Schachter, supra note 136. 
145. Id. 
146. See Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, Distinguished Lecturer, CUNY School of Law 
(Nov. 8, 2017). 
147. See Miles Galvin, The Early Development of the Organized Labor Movement in Puerto Rico, 3 
LATIN AM. PERSP. 17, 33 (1976). 
148. See Telephone Interview with Ellen Chapnick, Lecturer in Law, Columbia University (Oct. 31, 
2017). 
149. See Telephone Interview with Paul Schachter, supra note 136. 
150. Id. Puerto Rico’s local courts operate in Spanish, using the civil system inherited from Spain. 
In contrast, federal courts use common law and operate in English. The federal courts pre-
sented progressive and independentista lawyers with a completely different kind of law from 
what they were taught in law school or usually practiced. 




 Some independentistas were incarcerated for not cooperat-
ing with these targeted grand-jury investigations.
152
 
As a result of these repressive and incessant tactics, most independentista 
leaders were forced to rethink their ideological stance.
153
 At the time, however, 
maintaining that position left these movements vulnerable to repressive legal 
tactics, particularly ones that beneﬁted from the independentista leaders’ lack of 
expertise in federal court. The recurring attacks on unions and the independence 
movement became so intense that “everyone recognized that the conditions on 
the ground had changed.”
154
 As a result, progressive and independentista leaders 
resorted not only to rights-based strategies, but also to federal rights-based strat-
egies, in order to insulate their movements from some of the repressive tactics 
used by the Puerto Rican government and the federal government. 
At the request of the MOU, and with the help of a recent law school graduate 
named Paul Schachter,
155
 Scribner set up the Puerto Rico Emergency Labor Law 
Project (PRELLP).
156
 While in Puerto Rico, Scribner and Schachter supported 
 
151. Progressive union leaders, among others, would be subpoenaed by federal grand juries and 
asked “to provide exemplars—samples of their hair, handwriting, voice demonstrations or 
participation in a line-up.” Judith Berkan, The Federal Grand Jury: An Introduction to the Insti-
tution, Its Historical Role, Its Current Use and the Problems Faced by the Target Witness, 17 REV. 
JURÍDICA U. INTERAMERICANA P.R. 103, 112 (1983). Refusing to do this would end in an arrest 
on the basis of contempt. Id. In addition, while the institution of the grand jury exists in 
Puerto Rico, it is not used in local courts. Id. at 104. 
152. See Judith Berkan, La década del 70 y el National Lawyers Guild, CLARIDAD (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://www.claridadpuertorico.com/content.html?news=963A6147C23AA70E734CBBCA 
30FE71F6 [https://perma.cc/W9R5-E76N]. 
153. According to some of the people I interviewed, there was little resistance from independen-
tista leaders regarding this change in strategy. See Telephone Interview with Paul Schachter, 
supra note 136; Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, supra note 146; infra Part IV. It 
should be noted that the people I interviewed were either much younger than the activists 
who devised this strategy or did not recall speciﬁc details about this decision. Because much 
of this strategizing occurred during a time of intense repression in Puerto Rico, little was doc-
umented. This Note attempts to piece together parts of that missing history, but has not been 
able to recover everyone’s stories. 
154. Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, supra note 146. 
155. Schachter noted that, although he was not involved in Puerto Rico’s struggle until he met 
Grant, he had already come into contact with Puerto Rico and issues related to its political 
status. For instance, as a high schooler in New York, Schachter had gone to lectures featuring 
Puerto Rican Socialist Party founder Juan Mari Brás. They later worked together at a law ﬁrm 
in Puerto Rico. See Telephone Interview with Paul Schachter, supra note 136. 
156. Id. Before the PRELLP took shape, Schachter and Scribner would travel back and forth be-
tween New York City and San Juan to teach a series of seminars meant to teach a whole cadre 
of lawyers how they could defend themselves. The Instituto de Seminarios de Leyes Obreras 
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independentistas and other community activists through varied legal work.
157
 
For instance, Scribner taught federal labor law to a group of lawyers who later 
founded the Bufete Sindical.
158
 Schachter also worked on the criminal contempt 
defense of local union leaders,
159
 protested the requirement that grand jurors 
speak English as constraining the socioeconomic diversity of the grand jury,
160
 
and supported strikes like those at Puerto Rican Cement, among other initia-
tives.
161
 Schachter helped vindicate the rights of Federico Cintrón Fallo, an 
MOU officer who, in July 1975, was falsely accused of robbing $30,000 from a 
bank.
162
 The case against Cintrón Fallo was ultimately dismissed after the FBI 
used questionable tactics to lead eyewitnesses to pick Cintrón Fallo from a series 
of photographs (the move was questionable because the robbers were wearing 
 
(ISLO) (Spanish for “Institute for Seminars on Labor Law”) was headquartered in San Juan, 
and was funded by a few churches, some unions, and CCR. Id. 
157. See Judith Berkan & Paul Schachter, Puerto Rico Legal Project, CLARIDAD (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://www.claridadpuertorico.com/content.html?news=9D111AE60AC8047B7B429361 
BCC1CAAB [https://perma.cc/7ZL3-BZZ4]. 
158. Spanish for “Union Law Firm.” The Bufete Sindical law ﬁrm took on workers’ rights cases and 
challenged repressive Puerto Rican and U.S. labor laws. See Pedro Grant Chacón, 1920-2012, 
MOVIMIENTO INDEPENDENTISTA NACIONAL HOSTOSIANO (Mar. 9, 2012, 1:44 AM), http://
minhpuertorico.org/index.php/noticias/55-noticias/1131-pedro-grant-chacon-1920-2012 
[https://perma.cc/FT5V-ZCLQ]; Paul Schachter, Mensaje del Lcdo. Paul Schachter, Miembro 
Fundador del Bufete Sindical, CLARIDAD (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.claridadpuertorico.com
/content.html?news=EE7CF71905042479E89D5B3DCE5EDC84 [https://perma.cc/DMT6 
-P2MU]. 
159. Schachter defended Arturo Grant and Radamés Acosta from the NLRB’s “extremely rare” use 
of criminal contempt to try to convict the union leaders. See E-mail from Paul Schachter to 
author (July 11, 2018, 8:14 PM EST) (on ﬁle with author). Schachter and his team succeeded 
in knocking out potential ﬁve-year terms of imprisonment and were able to get the courts to 
rule that the maximum penalty was a misdemeanor. See id. Even though the court denied the 
defendants a jury trial and sentenced Acosta to three months incarceration, it was seen as a 
positive result that “gave hope to the labor movement.” Id. For more details on the case, see 
United States v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 576 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1978). 
160. Some of this work is reﬂected in cases like United States v. Marcano, 508 F. Supp. 462 (D.P.R. 
1980), and United States v. Ramos Colon, 415 F. Supp. 459 (D.P.R. 1976). See Berkan, supra note 
151, at 113 n.42 (noting that, at the time, there had been “a number of challenges to the grand 
jury in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico” because the “English-
language requirement [was] seen as greatly limiting the breadth of composition of the ju-
ries”). 
161. See Berkan & Schachter, supra note 157. Other notable cases that Schachter led include NLRB 
v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976); In re Maury Santiago, 533 F.2d 727 
(1st Cir. 1976); and Crown Cork de Puerto Rico, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 243 (1984). See E-
mail from Paul Schachter, supra note 159. 
162. See E-mail from Paul Schachter, supra note 159. 




 The government and some newspapers like El Nuevo Día used this 
case to try to discredit the labor movement by associating it with “criminal ac-
tivity and violence.”
164
 The vindication of Cintrón Fallo was important for un-
covering government abuses and bolstering the labor movement in Puerto Rico. 
The National Lawyers Guild eventually took over the ad hoc PRELLP and 
turned it into the Puerto Rico Legal Project, which opened in Puerto Rico in 
March of 1977.
165
 The Project was modeled after an office that the Guild opened 
in Mississippi that operated from 1962 to 1965, during Freedom Summer.
166
 
That office similarly focused on public education, legal training, and rotating 
volunteer lawyers who came from the North.
167
 The Project would bring one or 
two lawyers down to Puerto Rico for about a year at a time, and they would train 
local lawyers in federal practice, bring them onto cases as co-counsel, and con-
nect them to other training resources.
168
 When the Project began, its litigation 
docket was mostly reactive, focusing on responding to federal grand-jury inves-
tigations of labor leaders, pursuing labor law cases before the NLRB, and engag-
ing in other antirepression work.
169
 Through these initiatives, the Project re-
sponded to local leaders’ efforts to reexamine their relationship to the law of the 
colonial oppressor and aimed to give Puerto Ricans the tools they needed to have 




165. CCR attorney José Antonio “Abi” Lugo, CCR legal worker Georgina Cestero, and members 
of the Guild, including Carl Broege, Paul Schachter, Richard Wagner, and Franklin Siegel, 
organized the Guild’s creation of the Project. See Telephone Interview with Judith Berkan, 
supra note 134; E-mail from Paul Schachter, supra note 159; Telephone Interview with Franklin 
Siegel, supra note 146. 
166. This Guild office aided the local Black population during Freedom Summer. See National Law-
yers Guild, in POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, AND 
POLICY 487 (Gwendolyn Mink & Alice O’Connor eds., 2004); Telephone Interview with 
Franklin Siegel, supra note 146. 
167. See Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, supra note 146. Other lawyers like Michael 
Withey, Jane Rasmussen, Jeffrey Fogel, and Rina Biaggi helped kick-start the Project. See Ber-
kan & Schachter, supra note 157. 
168. Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, supra note 146; see also Telephone Interview with 
Ellen Chapnick, supra note 148. 
169. See Telephone Interview with Judith Berkan, supra note 134; see also Berkan & Schachter, supra 
note 157 (specifying that the Project “also collaborated with local activists in denouncing the 
federal COINTELPRO program” and published a “law journal entitled Puerto Rican Journal 
of Human Rights,” which included contributions by Guild “members and local activists”). 
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B. Lawyering for the People 
Judith Berkan and Ellen Chapnick were among the lawyers ﬁrst recruited by 
the Project who came from the mainland to serve a rotation in Puerto Rico. 
Chapnick, whom I interviewed for this Note, used her expertise to take up envi-
ronmental and worker-safety issues,
170
 as well as grand-jury work. Although 
Chapnick left Puerto Rico after her one-year commitment ended,
171
 Berkan 
stayed. As a young lawyer, Berkan was already active in the Puerto Rico solidarity 
movement in the United States.
172
 Berkan’s arrival to the island coincided with 
two seminal moments in modern Puerto Rican history: the blockade of the U.S. 
Navy by Vieques ﬁshermen and the Cerro Maravilla murders. 
Although Vieques, a municipality of Puerto Rico, is best known for the 
highly publicized protests that occurred in the early 2000s,
173
 the campaign to 
oust the U.S. Navy from the island began many years earlier, in the 1970s. Since 
World War II,
174
 the Navy had used Vieques to conduct military training exer-
cises and test chemical weapons.
175
 Besides exposing the island’s delicate ecosys-
tem to toxic chemicals, the Navy’s bombing of Vieques severely interfered with 
locals’ ability to engage in commercial activities, such as ﬁshing and promoting 
tourism.
176
 In response to Navy operations on the island, on February 6, 1978, a 
 
170. In particular, Chapnick worked to combat the lack of safety in Puerto Rico’s pharmaceutical 
industry. Since worker health and safety laws were lax or nonexistent in Puerto Rico, island 
workers were not given safety gear. See Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, supra note 
146. 
171. See Telephone Interview with Ellen Chapnick, supra note 148. 
172. In law school, Berkan was involved in Puerto Rican study groups and was an active member 
of the Guild. She also worked for the community-based Centro Puertorriqueño para la Justicia 
en Hartford (Spanish for “Puerto Rican Center for Justice in Hartford”). See Telephone Inter-
view with Judith Berkan, supra note 134. 
173. See McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 83; Dana Canedy, Navy Leaves a Battered Island, and Puerto 
Ricans Cheer, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/02/us/navy 
-leaves-a-battered-island-and-puerto-ricans-cheer.html [https://perma.cc/B483-R92U]. 
174. See McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 83. 
175. Napalm, depleted uranium, and other heavy metals were deployed in training exercises. See 
Sarah Emerson, The Puerto Rican Island the US Military Destroyed Has Been Forgotten After Hur-
ricane Maria, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 20, 2017), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us 
/article/ywbznm/the-puerto-rican-island-the-us-military-destroyed-has-been-forgotten 
-after-hurricane-maria [https://perma.cc/7QBJ-U7ML]. 
176. See Fishermen Protest U.S. Navy Exercises, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 1979), http://www.nytimes
.com/1979/01/28/archives/ﬁshermen-protest-us-navy-exercises-ﬁshins-at-an-island-off 
-san.html [https://perma.cc/VQ2M-AVF3]. 
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group of Vieques ﬁshermen navigated their eighteen-foot ﬁshing boats into mil-





 was part of a bigger strategy initiated by 
Vieques residents to drive the Navy off the island altogether. 
A few months after the direct-action campaign in Vieques began, two young 
independentistas were shot by Puerto Rican police on Cerro Maravilla, a remote 
mountain in the Toro Negro Forest.
179
 The police claimed that they acted in self-
defense,
180
 and that the young men—Carlos Soto Arriví and Arnaldo Darío Ro-
sado
181
—were radical left-wing terrorists who were planning to sabotage a tele-
vision relay tower.
182
 Carlos Romero Barceló, then Governor of Puerto Rico, 
lauded the police officers as “heroes.”
183
 Investigations conducted by both the 
Puerto Rico Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Justice between 
1978 and 1980 did not ﬁnd the police culpable.
184
 Local media noted inconsist-




The Vieques blockade and the Cerro Maravilla incident caused the Project to 
change its previously reactive stance and engage in more affirmative litigation 
 
177. See McCaffrey, supra note 16, at 329. 
178. See Fishermen Protest U.S. Navy Exercises, supra note 176. 
179. See Mireya Navarro, Puerto Rico Gripped by Its Watergate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 1992), https://
www.nytimes.com/1992/01/30/us/puerto-rico-gripped-by-its-watergate.html [https://
perma.cc/Q995-FGBL]. 
180. See Nydia Bauzá, A 38 años del caso Maravilla, PRIMERA HORA (July 23, 2016), http://www 
.primerahora.com/noticias/puerto-rico/nota/a38anosdelcasomaravilla-1166164 [https://
perma.cc/VP7D-UR8G]. 
181. Carlos Soto Arriví, son of famed Puerto Rican author Pedro Juan Soto, was eighteen at the 
time of his murder. Arnaldo Darío Rosado was twenty-four years old. See Navarro, supra note 
179. 
182. Papo Coss, Días antes y días después de Cerro Maravilla, 80GRADOS (July 22, 2016), http://www
.80grados.net/dias-antes-y-dias-despues-de-cerro-maravilla [https://perma.cc/QV6C 
-E9UZ]. 
183. Laura Rivera Melendez, Romero: Mistake to Call Police ‘Heroes’ in Cerro Maravilla, P.R. HERALD 
(Sept. 15, 2003), http://www.puertorico-herald.org/issues/2003/vol7n38/RomeroMistake 
-en.html [https://perma.cc/4W5Y-Z4C6]. 
184. See Moreno-Morales v. United States, 334 F.3d 140, 143 n.1 (1st Cir. 2003); Anne Nelson, Cerro 
Maravilla Deaths: Police Cover-up Rock [sic] Puerto Rico, NACLA (Sept. 25, 2007), https://nacla
.org/article/cerro-maravilla-deaths-police-cover-rock-puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/4C2N 
-YT6S]. 
185. See Soto v. Romero Barceló, 559 F. Supp. 739, 744 (D.P.R. 1983); Nelson, supra note 184. 
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and legal work. For instance, in Romero-Barcelo v. Brown,
186
 Berkan represented 
the Vieques ﬁshermen, who sought to enjoin the Navy from using Viequense 
lands to carry out military training exercises.
187
 The Vieques ﬁshermen alleged 
harm to “all residents of Vieques, to its ﬁshing and agricultural industries, to 
certain endangered species of plant and wildlife, to officially designated and un-
identiﬁed historical sites,” and to private property due to the Navy’s activities.
188
 
Although the litigation ultimately did not secure an injunction against the 
Navy’s activities,
189
 the district court found that the Navy was in violation of 
several environmental statutes.
190
 More importantly, however, the extensive dis-
covery stemming from the case, which the district court described as a “legal 
marathon,”
191
 gave Berkan and her team a wealth of materials relating to Navy 
operations on Vieques.
192
 These materials fueled Vieques organizing and other 
suits against the Navy for several years.
193
 
Through the Project, Berkan also enlisted Guild lawyers from the United 
States, including police-misconduct experts Michael Avery and Richard Soble, 
to uncover what truly happened atop Cerro Maravilla.
194
 Subsequent investiga-
tions later revealed that the Cerro Maravilla murders were the result of a local 
and federal cover-up.
195
 Ten officers were convicted of various crimes.
196
 Berkan 
and other Project attorneys, representing the victims’ families, brought suit in 
federal court against former governor Romero Barceló and other defendants in 
 
186. 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979) (denying an injunction), rev’d, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(vacating and ordering the district court to issue an injunction under the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act and holding that the Act withdrew the district court’s equitable discretion 
to issue alternative relief), rev’d sub nom. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) 
(holding that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act did not require the district court to 
issue an injunction). 
187. See id. at 651. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 708 (noting that the Navy’s use of Vieques for military training exercises was “essential 
to the defense of the Nation and that the enjoining of said activities [was] not an appropriate 
relief for the correction of the cited statutory violations”). 
190. Id. at 705. 
191. Id. at 652. 
192. Id; see also Telephone Interview with Judith Berkan, supra note 134. 
193. See Telephone Interview with Judith Berkan, supra note 134. 
194. See Law for the People, NAT’L LAW. GUILD 2 (Oct. 2013), https://www.nlg.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2017/03/DinnerJournal2013-FULL-FINAL-reduced.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XHL 
-6RQP]; Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, supra note 143. 
195. See Navarro, supra note 179. 
196. Id. 




 In their complaint, they alleged that the former governor was 
“directly responsible”
198
 for the independentistas’ deaths, “participated in a con-
spiracy with the police to ambush and kill the[] two men, for his own political 
purposes,”
199
 and that he and other defendants “fail[ed] to properly train and 
supervise”
200
 the officers involved in the incident. The complaint was the island’s 
ﬁrst Section 1983 claim against police brutality.
201
 In July 1979, the case pro-
ceeded to discovery.
202
 After three-and-a-half years of litigation, the district 
court granted Romero Barceló’s motion for summary judgment.
203
 In Soto v. 
Romero Barceló, which awarded attorneys’ fees to the former governor, District 
Judge Juan Pérez-Giménez stated that the plaintiffs’ case was “frivolous, unrea-
sonable,”
204
 and “without foundation at its inception.”
205
 The judge accused the 
plaintiffs of only wanting to “creat[e] publicity and obtain[] political ad-
vantage.”
206
 The judge further complained that plaintiffs’ counsel routinely 
“publicized information obtained through discovery” and had been in “frequent 
contact” with the media.
207
 
Even though the case seemed like another loss for the Project, the Project’s 
Cerro Maravilla litigation was critical in creating the conditions necessary to re-
veal the truth about that infamous day. A few months after Soto, the Puerto Rican 
 
197. See Soto v. Romero Barceló, 559 F. Supp. 739, 740 (D.P.R. 1983); Rina Biaggi, The National 
Lawyers Guild Puerto Rico Legal Project, CLARIDAD (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www 
.claridadpuertorico.com/content.html?news=9CEA8584D4E8410F1B6FC6DE92E78452 
[https://perma.cc/E7RB-HJ9B]. 
198. Soto, 559 F. Supp. at 740. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. The U.S. lawyers involved in this effort included Michael Avery, Catherine Roraback (who 
was well known for her work on the right to privacy and the New Haven Black Panther trials 
of 1971), and Richard Soble. They worked alongside Puerto Rican lawyers José Antonio “Abi” 
Lugo, Peter Berkowitz, and Rina Biaggi García. See Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, 
supra note 143. 
202. See Soto, 559 F. Supp. at 740. 
203. The plaintiffs did not appeal this decision. Id. at 740-41. 
204. Id. at 744. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 741. According to the court, the plaintiffs wanted to depose former governor Romero 
Barceló on July 24, 1979, at the Puerto Rico Bar Association. See id. The court noted that this 
was “obviously calculated to create maximum publicity since it was immediately before the 
ﬁrst anniversary of the shootout at which Soto [Arriví] and Rosado were killed.” Id. 
207. Id. 
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Senate held public, televised hearings about the incident.
208
 The legislative ses-
sions were primarily based on the discovery materials gathered through the Pro-
ject’s case.
209
 In those hearings, several officers conﬁrmed what the Puerto Rican 
media, the victims’ families, and the Project suspected.
210
 Police officers testiﬁed 
that an undercover agent had inﬁltrated the youths’ independentista group, con-
vinced the two young men to go to Cerro Maravilla to broadcast “a revolutionary 
message,”
211
 and tipped off police.
212
 As many as twenty officers later ambushed 
Soto Arriví and Rosado.
213




The officers’ confession reopened the case, and in February 1984, ten officers 
were indicted on charges of conspiracy, perjury in two previous federal investi-
gations, and obstruction of justice.
215
 After trial, the majority of accusations re-
sulted in guilty verdicts,
216
 and one officer was later convicted of second-degree 
murder.
217
 Romero Barceló lost his bid for reelection in 1984.
218
 “That was a 
critical moment in Puerto Rican history,” University of Puerto Rico (UPR) po-
litical science professor Javier Colón Morera told me.
219
 Because of the Project’s 
work, it was revealed that the Puerto Rican government, with the help of the 
federal government, had conspired to kill two young independentistas.
220
 Puerto 
Ricans had to contend with government-sponsored repression that, though cen-
tral to the island’s history, seemed long forgotten. 
 
208. See Bauzá, supra note 180. 
209. See Biaggi, supra note 197; Telephone Interview with Judith Berkan, supra note 134. 
210. See Navarro, supra note 179. These officers were granted immunity from prosecution. 
211. Nelson, supra note 184. 
212. See Navarro, supra note 179. 
213. See id. 
214. See id. 
215. See Reginald Stuart, 10 From Puerto Rico Police Indicted in Cover-up of ’78 Killings, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 7, 1984), https://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/07/us/10-from-puerto-rico-police 
-indicted-in-cover-up-of-78-killings.html [https://perma.cc/ZG4Y-LTU5]. 
216. See United States v. Reveron Martinez, 836 F.2d 684, 685-86 (1st Cir. 1988). 
217. See Moreno-Morales v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, No. 96-2358, 1998 WL 124718, at *1 (1st Cir. 
Jan. 20, 1998). 
218. See Navarro, supra note 179. 
219. Telephone Interview with Dr. J. Javier Colón Morera, Professor, University of Puerto Rico 
(Mar. 26, 2018). 
220. See Jim McGee, Ex-Justice Official Cites ‘Coverup’ by FBI in ’78 Puerto Rico Shootings, WASH. 
POST (May 9, 1992), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/05/09/ex 
-justice-official-cites-coverup-by-fbi-in-78-puerto-rico-shootings/722ead3e-b875-461d 
-957e-9ef43f1c481b [https://perma.cc/CHG4-F94X]. 
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The visibility that accompanied the Project’s shift in strategy put activists’ 
and attorneys’ lives at risk. For example, in May 1979, twenty-one people were 
arrested for protesting on Vieques land claimed by the Navy. Seventeen of the 
“Vieques 21,” as they were known, were convicted and sentenced to prison.
221
 
One of the protesters, Ángel Rodríguez Cristóbal, was sent to Florida to serve 
his six-month prison sentence. He was later “found hanging” in his cell with a 
large gash on his face.
222
 Although Berkan was part of the “Vieques 21,” she was 




Berkan’s involvement with the “Vieques 21” and the movement in Vieques 
more generally led to a series of politically motivated maneuvers meant to stop 
her from practicing law in Puerto Rico. The U.S. District Court for the District 
of Puerto Rico ﬁrst shut down Berkan’s pro hac vice practice.
224
 Then, despite 
Berkan’s obtaining the highest possible score on the Puerto Rico Bar Examina-
tion (which was conducted entirely in Spanish at the time), the district court 
blocked her admission to the local federal bar for almost three years.
225
 The dis-
trict court gave no reason for this decision; it sent Berkan a letter which had only 
one sentence: “I am sorry to inform you that your application for admission to 
 
221. See Historic Cases: United States v. Berkan, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Oct. 9, 2007), https:// 
ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/united-states-v-berkan [https://perma.cc
/E498-ASUT]. 
222. Id. Officials of the federal detention center in Tallahassee described his death as suicide by 
hanging; Puerto Rican activists claimed, and continue to maintain, that Rodríguez Cristóbal 
was murdered while in solitary conﬁnement. See Historic Cases: United States v. Berkan, supra 
note 221; Puerto Ricans Vow to Avenge Death in U.S. Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 1979), https://
www.nytimes.com/1979/11/18/archives/puerto-ricans-vow-to-avenge-death-in-us-prison
.html [https://perma.cc/F884-3HTN]; Telephone Interview with Judith Berkan, supra note 
134. 
223. See Historic Cases: United States v. Berkan, supra note 221. The defendants could not be con-
victed of trespassing on naval land because the case established that there was not enough 
evidence of U.S. ownership of the Vieques beaches where the 21 protested. See id. 
224. See Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, supra note 143. 
225. See id.; Law for the People, supra note 194, at 2. 
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the bar has been denied.”
226
 Berkan also received threats that, at times, forced 
her to move from her house.
227
 
The Project’s lawyers were under extreme surveillance by the Intelligence 
Division of the Puerto Rico police, particularly during the Cerro Maravilla liti-
gation.
228
 Additionally, there were bombings of Claridad, a local independen-
tista-leaning newspaper,
229
 and the Puerto Rico Bar Association, known for its 
defense of human rights and “commitment to decolonization.”
230
 Berkan was 
aware of plans to bomb Vieques Air Link, a small airline that connects Vieques 
and Culebra to mainland Puerto Rico, particularly when lawyers like her were 
on their planes.
231
 In an interview, Berkan said that those plans were devised “to 
kill [her and her colleagues].”
232
 She added, “Those particular years under [Gov-
ernor] Romero [Barceló] were very intense . . . . any dissidence was really not 
tolerated. There was a lot of violence; it was a scary time.”
233
 
C. A Project of Their Own 
Despite the criminalization of dissent and targeting of independentistas, 
progressives, and those trying to help them, the Project continued its work. The 
 
226. In re Berkan, 648 F.2d 1386, 1388 (1981). Berkan and the U.S. Attorney involved in the case 
suggested that Berkan was denied admission because of the “Vieques 21” arrest and her failure 
to obey a civil injunction entered by the district court. Id.; see Telephone Interview with Judith 
Berkan, supra note 134. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit insisted:  
In our supervisory capacity, we are entitled—in fact we think we are obliged—to 
insist that a district court in this Circuit do more than play at cat and mouse with a 
rejected but seemingly qualiﬁed bar applicant, with respect to providing a state-
ment of reasons for her rejection and offering such hearing procedures as may be 
appropriate in her situation. A federal court, by its silence, may not foist upon one 
in Berkan’s position the burden of somehow compelling it to grant the process to 
which she is entitled as a matter of fundamental right. 
Berkan, 648 F.2d at 1390. 
227. See Telephone Interview with Judith Berkan, supra note 134. 
228. Project attorneys’ phones were tapped and their social activities were inﬁltrated by police. See 
Biaggi, supra note 197. 
229. See Berkan, supra note 152; Telephone Interview with Judith Berkan, supra note 134; see also 
ALFREDO LÓPEZ, DOÑA LICHA’S ISLAND: MODERN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO 146 (1987) 
(noting numerous attacks on independentista organizations). 
230. Law for the People, supra note 194. 
231. See Telephone Interview with Judith Berkan, supra note 134. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
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Project garnered the support of many in the Puerto Rican community, and ex-
pertise eventually began to accrue to Puerto Rican lawyers.
234
 By 1982, the Pro-
ject converted itself into an organization that was governed and staffed by Puerto 
Ricans.
235
 The Instituto Puertorriqueño de Derechos Civiles,
236
 as it rebranded itself, 
became the island’s ﬁrst public-interest law ﬁrm.
237
 Although much of the Insti-
tuto’s work involved litigation, its work was also comprised of community and 
public education,
238
 media work, and community organizing.
239
 Like the Project 
before it, the Instituto came out of a time that was rich with community and 
political activity—student, labor, and independentista movements were particu-
larly energized.
240
 Colón Morera, who worked at the Instituto from 1984 to 1986 
after attending law school, remembers that the Instituto was in the middle of it 
all as a “much-needed legal resource for . . . concrete community and political 
activities.”
241
 The Instituto took on several projects, which included work on is-
sues like women’s rights, the U.S. Navy’s occupation of Vieques and Culebra, 









234. See Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, supra note 146. 
235. See Berkan & Schachter, supra note 157. 
236. Spanish for “Puerto Rican Institute for Civil Rights.” 
237. See Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, supra note 146. The Instituto’s staff initially 
included Rina Biaggi García and Peter Berkowitz. See Telephone Interview with Franklin 
Siegel, supra note 143. Berkowitz collaborated with Berkan, who remained in Puerto Rico after 
leaving the Project, and with José Antonio “Abi” Lugo, who moved from New York to San 
Juan. See id. Attorneys like Berkan and Berkowitz remained involved with the Instituto even 
when they were not part of its formal staff, acting as volunteer attorneys for the organization. 
See Telephone Interview with William Ramírez (Mar. 23, 2018). 
238. See Telephone Interview with Nora Vargas Acosta (Mar. 27, 2018). 
239. See Telephone Interview with William Ramírez, supra note 237. 
240. See Telephone Interview with Dr. J. Javier Colón Morera, supra note 219. 
241. Id. 
242. See id.; see also Villa Sin Miedo, destruida, PAÍS (May 20, 1982), https://elpais.com/diario/1982
/05/20/internacional/390693623_850215.html [https://perma.cc/7DE4-7Y7G] (describing 
how the forced eviction of Villa Sin Miedo residents was “very violent”—multiple people were 
injured and one police officer died on the scene—and the Puerto Rican government blamed 
the violence on “subversive leftists” (translated from Spanish)). 
243. At the time, police were engaging in criminal behavior, including kidnappings and extrajudi-
cial killings. People commonly referred to this group as the “escuadrón de la muerte,” or “death 
squad.” See Telephone Interview with William Ramírez, supra note 237. Though there is no 
longer a death squad, Ramírez told me that the American Civil Liberties Union of Puerto Rico 
continues to work on police-abuse cases. See id. 
244. See id. 
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Puerto Rican lawyer Charles Hey Maestre, the Instituto’s second Executive 
Director, was crucial to the Instituto’s growth.
245
 As Nora Vargas Acosta, a clin-
ical professor at the UPR School of Law and a civil rights attorney who began 
her legal career at the Instituto, explained, “You can’t talk about the Instituto 
without talking about Charlie.”
246
 Hey Maestre recruited Puerto Ricans like Var-
gas Acosta, William Ramírez—who now serves as the Executive Director of the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Puerto Rico—and others he identiﬁed as hav-
ing a commitment to human and civil rights.
247
 
Under Hey Maestre’s leadership, the Instituto became the force behind liti-
gating the carpetas cases, which denounced the decades-long practice of both 
local- and federal-government surveillance in Puerto Rico.
248
 The Puerto Rican 
Supreme Court declared the practice unconstitutional in 1987,
249
 and Hey Maes-
tre’s efforts allowed thousands of Puerto Ricans to sue the government seeking 
redress for being spied upon and discriminated against because of the dossi-
ers.
250
 Despite facing pressure from local and federal authorities to drop the case, 
Hey Maestre did not waver in his commitment.
251
 In 1998, the government re-
leased ﬁles on thousands of Puerto Ricans and eventually compensated the vic-
 
245. See Nydia Bauzá, Muere el abogado Charles Hey Maestre, PRIMERA HORA (Feb. 6, 2017), http://
www.primerahora.com/noticias/puerto-rico/nota/muereelabogadocharlesheymaestre 
-1204771 [https://perma.cc/T8GL-JMXH]; Telephone Interview with Judith Berkan, supra 
note 134. José Antonio “Abi” Lugo was the Instituto’s ﬁrst Executive Director and William 
Ramírez was the Instituto’s third Executive Director. See Telephone Interview with William 
Ramírez, supra note 237. 
246. Telephone Interview with Nora Vargas Acosta, supra note 238. Before law school, Vargas 
Acosta was involved in civil rights work as an activist. See id. 
247. See id.; Telephone Interview with William Ramírez, supra note 237. 
248. See John Marino, Apology Isn’t Enough for Puerto Rico Spy Victims, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 1999), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/12/28/apology-isnt-enough-for 
-puerto-rico-spy-victims/1d5d3e6a-805d-4919-963b-8b0f6a2eb0d7 [https://perma.cc
/GD3D-AJHR]; Telephone Interview with William Ramírez, supra note 237. 
249. See Noriega Rodríguez v. Hernandez Colón, 130 P.R. Dec. 919, 926 (1992); Noriega Rodrí-
guez v. Gobernador, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 285 (1988); Marino, supra note 248. 
250. See Marino, supra note 248; Telephone Interview with William Ramírez, supra note 237; see 
also Joseﬁna Pantoja Oquendo, En Memoria: Las Huellas de Charlie, CLARIDAD (Feb. 14, 2017), 
http://www.claridadpuertorico.com/content.html?news=688B1C79D2DA7F9B602A1607 
009285B3 [https://perma.cc/96WW-DA8F] (noting how a portion of the case’s damages 
were donated to Claridad so that the newspaper could buy an office for its operations). 
251. See Jennifer Altmann, Lives: Charles Hey-Maestre ’77, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY. (Feb. 7, 
2018), https://paw.princeton.edu/article/lives-charles-hey-maestre-77 [https://perma.cc
/8HXM-5KSU]. 




 After Hey Maestre’s successful litigation, Colón Morera, the UPR pro-
fessor who worked at the Instituto after graduating from law school, found out 
that the government had a carpeta on him, and noted that some of the activities 




The carpetas litigation provides another example of how rights talk provided 
a space for activism in Puerto Rico. Fortunately, the carpetas win was not a one-
off occurrence. Building from their work at the Instituto, Hey Maestre, Vargas 
Acosta, and other attorneys later engaged in pivotal impact litigation related to 
police brutality, discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation, 
and sexual harassment through private civil rights practice.
254
 The impetus for 
the Instituto and progressive lawyering on the island ﬁnally came from Puerto 
Ricans themselves.
255
 The importance of this development cannot be under-
stated. As colonial subjects, much of Puerto Ricans’ legal and political reality is 
deﬁned by the United States. Having Puerto Ricans be their own advocates on 
these issues disrupted Puerto Ricans’ subjugation to, and dependence on, the 
United States. To be sure, Puerto Ricans were still litigating in federal court, us-
ing U.S. civil rights laws—they did not divorce themselves from the United 
 
252. See id.; Pedro Reina Pérez, Puerto Rico’s Imperial Hangover, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 23, 2016), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2016/03/23/puerto-rico-imperial-hangover
/TAhLIIPPzMCQMl1GFA0ghO/story.html [https://perma.cc/XXZ9-YRLT]. 
253. See Telephone interview with Dr. J. Javier Colón Morera, supra note 219. 
254. Some of the most notable cases taken on by Bufete De Jesús, Hey y Vargas (Spanish for “Law 
Offices of De Jesús, Hey and Vargas”) were Otero-Burgos v. Inter-American University, 558 F.3d 
1 (1st Cir. 2009), Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988), and Sánchez 
de León v. Secretario de Justicia, 157 P.R. Dec. 360 (2002). See Carlos del Valle Cruz, R.I.P. 
Charles Hey Maestre, 80GRADOS (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.80grados.net/r-i-p-charles-hey 
-maestre [https://perma.cc/BUR6-G46Z]; Telephone Interview with Adalina De Jesús 
(Nov. 14, 2017). 
255. Hey Maestre’s work was renowned in Puerto Rico, noted for its impact on the lives of the 
persecuted, the poor, and other vulnerable groups on the island. See del Valle Cruz, supra note 
254. After running his own private civil rights ﬁrm from 1989 to 2006, Hey Maestre served as 
the Executive Director of Servicios Legales de Puerto Rico (Spanish for “Puerto Rico Legal Aid”), 
popularly known as the “bufete de los pobres,” or “the poor man’s ﬁrm,” until 2016. Id. His 
dedication to providing legal services for the poor and other vulnerable populations continued 
up until his untimely death. In February 2017, Hey Maestre passed away after battling an ag-
gressive cancer for over a year. See Bauzá, supra note 245; Pantoja Oquendo, supra note 250. In 
his ﬁnal months, he worked to found the Fundación Fondo de Acceso a la Justicia (FFAJ), Puerto 
Rico’s own IOLTA program. See Bauzá, supra note 245. FFAJ recently named a scholarship 
after Hey Maestre, meant to support recipients for one or two years to engage in projects that 
address the legal needs of the island’s most vulnerable. See La Fundación Fondo De Acceso a la 
Justicia anuncia la apertura de su nuevo programa de becas “Charles Hey Maestre,” FUNDACIÓN 
FONDO DE ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA (Nov. 7, 2017), https://fundacionfondoaccesoalajusticia.org
/la-fundacion-fondo-de-acceso-la-justicia-anuncia-la-apertura-de-su-nuevo-programa-de 
-becas-charles-hey-maestre [https://perma.cc/ZWU2-BK4N]. 
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States completely. But it is important to recognize the role of rights talk here: as 
a gateway to political engagement. Puerto Ricans were ﬁghting for their voices 
to be heard, challenging those who told them to step aside, and devising new 
political visions for their society. In other words, they were engaging in nation 
building, key to ensuring any type of decolonization. 
iv.  turning towards rights talk 
Up to this point, this Note has argued that litigation and rights talk, best 
illustrated by the work of the Project and its progeny, were beneﬁcial in Puerto 
Rico because they facilitated movement lawyering; produced concrete, beneﬁcial 
results, such as revealing the repressive tactics of the FBI and the Puerto Rican 
government in the Cerro Maravilla and the carpetas cases; and trained local law-
yers in federal and civil rights practice, creating a foundation for Puerto Rico-
based lawyering on a wide variety of issues. In this Part, I further elaborate on 
the importance of rights talk for colonized people. I argue that the results of the 
Project and its progeny rebut CLS’s critique of rights, proving that rights-based 
advocacy is valuable in the colonial context. 
A. Rights Talk as Restitution 
Puerto Ricans’ interpretation of the legacy of the Project and its progeny 
shows the error of CLS in underappreciating the beneﬁts of litigation and rights 
discourse for oppressed minorities. Explaining why one might choose to engage 
with a rights framework in a colonized nation like Puerto Rico, Ramírez pointed 
to the tremendous political repression and access-to-information issues that law-
yers and activists had to surmount. Ramírez posited that, as an advocate, you 
might opt for litigation not because it will give you the outcome you want, but 
because it will give you the exposure you need to educate the public on a given 
issue.
256
 Ramírez’s comment echoes Tushnet’s concern about lawyers expecting 
too much from their legal work.
257
 At the same time, Ramírez suggests that, bor-
rowing Tushnet’s terminology, you can still win by losing.
258
 When taking a 
high-proﬁle case, Ramírez argued, even if you do not win in court, you can still 
win because “the issue is out there, people are being educated, [and] you gave it 
a ﬁght.”
259
 This is particularly true in the context of a colony, where the act of 
speaking up in the face of severe political repression is profoundly consequential. 
 
256. See Telephone interview with William Ramírez, supra note 237. 
257 See Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, supra note 39, at 34. 
258. See id. at 30. 
259. Telephone Interview with William Ramírez, supra note 237. 
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The legal work of the Project and the Instituto was instrumental to uncovering 
censored, concealed, or inaccessible information and to keeping conversations 
about those secrets alive. 
The Project and the Instituto operated with the knowledge that Puerto Rico 
is a colony. Even though that might seem indisputable today, at the time of these 
efforts, that reality was not openly articulated.
260
 For most of Puerto Rico’s his-
tory, talking about colonialism was not only politically unpalatable, it was also 
met with discrimination and violent repression. Unlike any organization at the 
time—and some would say since
261
—the Instituto was very conscious of how the 
United States controlled the island in every respect.
262
 According to Ramírez, 
when issues or cases were taken, that reality was always kept in mind and the 
Instituto was “a lot more forceful and a lot more direct in taking on these is-
sues . . . . [It was] fearless.”
263
 The Project and the Instituto’s work regarding 
incidents like Cerro Maravilla prevented those politically motivated murders, 
among other injustices, from being forgotten, thereby defending and validating 
the kind of dissent that was lethal in Puerto Rico. Vargas Acosta believes that the 
Cerro Maravilla case also left its mark in that it forced the government to 
acknowledge and respond to its participation in political repression and state vi-
olence.
264
 For her, like Ramírez and Colón Morera, the case brought forward to 
the people of Puerto Rico that this kind of repression on the island, inconceivable 
to many, was not over.
265
 Once this repression became a public issue, Puerto Ri-
cans had to think about how that repression and subsequent cover-up were al-
 
260. Before the advent of the Internet Age, information in Puerto Rico tended to be disseminated 
along party lines. El Nuevo Día is associated with the pro-statehood party, El Mundo was as-
sociated with the pro-commonwealth, or status quo, party, and Claridad is associated with the 
pro-independence party. See id. Carlos Romero Barceló, who served as the island’s Governor 
during the Cerro Maravilla incident, is an avid supporter of Puerto Rican statehood. See José 
A. Delgado Robles, Pro-Statehood Campaign Revived, NUEVO DÍA (Jan. 11, 2018, 8:35 AM), 
https://www.elnuevodia.com/english/english/nota/pro-statehoodcampaignrevived 
-2389191 [https://perma.cc/64QF-PX6U]; see also Carlos Romero Barceló, Puerto Rico, 
U.S.A.: The Case for Statehood, FOREIGN AFF. (Fall 1980), https://www.foreignaffairs.com 
/articles/puerto-rico/1980-09-01/puerto-rico-usa-case-statehood [https://perma.cc/3XGN
-9X8Q] (“I am convinced, both as a Latin American and a U.S. citizen, that statehood for 
Puerto Rico would constitute a boon for the nation, as well as for the island.”). 
261. See Telephone Interview with Nora Vargas Acosta, supra note 238. 
262. See Telephone Interview with William Ramírez, supra note 237. 
263. Id. The Instituto continued its work on the Cerro Maravilla case despite having both its offices 
and its staff’s homes trashed by the police on multiple occasions. See id. 
264. See Telephone Interview with Nora Vargas Acosta, supra note 238. 
265. See id. 
the yale law journal 128:792  2019 
834 
lowed to happen in the ﬁrst place, whether such actions would be acceptable to 
their society, and how to address those conﬂicts going forward.
266
 
Generally speaking, the goal of the Project, the Instituto, and other progres-
sive lawyers was not exclusively to win cases, but to support ongoing movements 
in Puerto Rico. Unlike Tushnet’s theory, which suggests that rights discourse is 
an obstacle to progressive change, these narratives account for the value of rights 
discourse in the context of a colony. Tushnet’s take on rights discourse is incom-
plete because it does not capture how rights discourse could be an instrument 
for progressive movements in Puerto Rico. By considering Puerto Rico’s history 
with colonialism and the Project’s rights-based strategies, we can start to see how 
rights talk helped give Puerto Ricans the impetus to articulate new demands, 
visions, and realities for themselves. This process facilitated a public space for 
Puerto Ricans to debate and contend with issues like government repression, 
censorship, politically-based murders, and sexual harassment, among others. 
Guided by local leaders and activists, the Project and its progeny successfully 
used rights discourse strategically to respond to and evolve with those turbulent 
times. 
The Project and its progeny also changed the face of lawyering in Puerto 
Rico. Pushing back against CLS’s critique of rights, Colón Morera said that “not-
withstanding all the limitations of the legal system,” this kind of legal work sig-
naled that “there was a space [to confront] some of the[] injustices” in Puerto 
Rico.
267
 In addition, the fact that a legal organization in Puerto Rico could rec-
ognize the island’s colonial situation while leaning on the assistance of lawyers 
with “the legal professionalism and the scope” of Judith Berkan, Peter Berkowitz, 
José Antonio “Abi” Lugo,
268
 and Hey Maestre, gave people the “idea that there 
could be another type of lawyer.”
269
 Lawyers in Puerto Rico could try to use legal 
mechanisms to propose social change; not all lawyers were trying to maintain 
the status quo.
270
 “I think that was a powerful message,” Colón Morera said.
271
 
Colón Morera added that the Project and its progeny led to there being a more 
 
266. See id. 
267. Telephone Interview with Dr. J. Javier Colón Morera, supra note 219. 
268. See En Rojo Editors, José Antonio (Abi) Lugo: A Lawyer with an Abundant Legacy, CLARIDAD 
(Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.claridadpuertorico.com/content.html?news=9CC5B49DF6E2 
C8D2B88307AFCDDBF096 [https://perma.cc/Z7Q9-H46T]. 
269. Telephone Interview with Dr. J. Javier Colón Morera, supra note 219. 
270. See id. 
271. Id. 
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diverse group of litigation that has continued to supplement movements and or-
ganizing on the island.
272
 
Although Puerto Rico’s colonial status remains unchanged after all of these 
efforts, as CLS would remind us, Vargas Acosta views this work as “a matter of 
survival.”
273
 Ultimately, one would aim to work on changing the colonial status 
through political action, and perhaps some human-rights forums.
274
 For the 
time being, however, Vargas Acosta believes that “you have to work on the reality 
of the people here.”
275
 This is at the core of what CLS’s critique of rights is miss-
ing when applied to Puerto Rico. CLS’s goal—to do away with the dependence 
on rights—omits the other reasons litigation or rights discourse might be neces-
sary in a place like Puerto Rico. The Project and its progeny’s use of litigation 
and rights talk introduced a kind of space and stability that allowed Puerto Rican 
advocates to engage with the law and develop the work that their communities 
needed most.
276
 It is important to note that although litigation was the Project’s 
 
272. See id.; see also Carmen Concepción, Justicia, Ambiente y Movilización Social en Puerto Rico, in 
PUERTO RICO Y LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS: UNA INTERSECCIÓN PLURAL 193, 200-09 (José Ja-
vier Colón Morera & Idsa E. Alegría Ortega eds., 2012) (describing how rights discourse has 
been used to support environmental-justice campaigns in Puerto Rico). 
273. Telephone Interview with Nora Vargas Acosta, supra note 238. 
274. See id. 
275. Id. 
276. Cf. Williams, supra note 59 (describing the real-world importance of rights talk and rights 
assertion for Black communities). See generally supra Section III.C (describing the importance 
of rights-based advocacy for Puerto Ricans as seen by the effects of the Project and its prog-
eny). For example, Siegel notes that working with the legal system was particularly beneﬁcial 
to independentistas when dealing with nationalist prisoners. See Telephone Interview with 
Franklin Siegel, supra note 146. Because obtaining clemency oftentimes requires legal advo-
cacy, Siegel argues that it was advantageous for Puerto Rican self-determination that “a group 
of [Puerto Rican] lawyers felt comfortable enough that [they would] work on freedom for 
the nationalists” through Congress. Id. More recently, Puerto Ricans pushed President Obama 
to release Oscar López Rivera, a Puerto Rican nationalist who was in U.S. custody for thirty-
six years for “seditious conspiracy” charges. See Carlos Rivera Giusti & David McFadden, 
Puerto Rican Militant Oscar Lopez Rivera Freed from Custody After 36 Years; Will Be in Chicago 
Thursday, CHI. TRIB. (May 17, 2017, 8:54 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local
/breaking/ct-oscar-lopez-rivera-freed-20170517-story.html [https://perma.cc/4HX9-EDJZ]; 
Ed Pilkington, ‘I’m No Threat’ – Will Obama Pardon One of the World’s Longest-Serving Political 
Prisoners?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2016/oct/16/obama-pardon-mandela-puerto-rico-oscar-lopez-rivera- [https://perma.cc
/BXC5-38ER]. Hey Maestre and other progressive attorneys were active in the campaign for 
López Rivera’s freedom. See Alejandro Torres Rivera, Tribuna Invitada: Charles Hey: Ángel de 
los perseguidos, NUEVO DÍA (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.elnuevodia.com/opinion/columnas
/charlesheyangeldelosperseguidos-columna-2289797 [https://perma.cc/395H-3BRQ]. 
While beyond the scope of this Note, the Project’s legal defense and representation of the 
Vieques ﬁshermen was also arguably a key moment for Vieques organizers, who needed as 
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primary goal in Puerto Rico, the Project, and the Instituto that sprang from it, 
also became the cradle of movement lawyering in Puerto Rico.
277
 These efforts 
housed a generation of civil rights lawyers, progressives, and advocates who de-
ﬁned the ﬁght for social justice in Puerto Rico for decades. CLS’s critique of 
rights, classifying rights as ineffectual, provides little, if any, space for the signif-
icance of that history and the mobilization it enabled. 
The Project’s history encapsulates how attorneys successfully imported civil 
rights and social justice expertise to Puerto Rico in order to facilitate movement 
lawyering on the island. In Berkan’s opinion, the Project helped motivate polit-
ical activism in Puerto Rico during the politically repressive time of the late 
1970s.
278
 Berkan indicated that, back then, there “had to be a legal response” in 
order to supplement local organizing efforts from people like the Vieques ﬁsher-
men.
279
 Having attorneys defend local organizers and advocates in federal court 
bolstered their causes and put them into the mainstream of Puerto Rican politics. 
Simultaneously, the Project attracted and trained progressive and independen-
tista Puerto Rican lawyers so that they would no longer be dependent on U.S.-
based attorneys for representation in federal courts. This helped break with a 
longstanding feature of Puerto Rico’s colonial status vis-à-vis the United States, 
in which Puerto Rico was dependent on the United States in the context of com-
merce, employment, and services. Franklin Siegel, a professor at City University 
of New York School of Law who was one of the founders and coordinators of the 
Project,
280
 said that the Project did not necessarily “d[o] anything heroic,” but 
“it helped create a capacity within a subsection of progressive lawyers in Puerto 
Rico” to eventually be able to do civil rights cases and social justice lawyering.
281
 
B. CLS, Revisited 
At the same time, for all that the Project accomplished, it was not without its 
drawbacks. CLS scholars would be correct if they asserted that the Project was 
not able to overcome the colonial structure at the root of many of the island’s 
problems. Indeed, some of the more militant independentistas would agree with 
 
much exposure as possible to strengthen their movement into a long-term, ideologically di-
verse strategy to eventually push the U.S. Navy out of Vieques. 
277. See del Valle Cruz, supra note 254. 
278. See Telephone Interview with Judith Berkan, supra note 134. 
279. Id. 
280. See Faculty Directory: Franklin Siegel, CUNY SCH. L., http://www.law.cuny.edu/faculty 
/directory/siegel.html [https://perma.cc/82QA-MQK8]. 
281. Telephone Interview with Franklin Siegel, supra note 146. 
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this critique. Even though the decision to engage with U.S. courts was led by 
many progressives and independentista union leaders like Grant, “dissonant 
philosophical strains” coexisted while the Project was active.
282
 Details of this 
continued disagreement are scarce,
283
 but it should be noted that two of the 
“Vieques 21” arrestees, Pedro Baiges Chapel and Ángel Rodríguez Cristóbal, did 
not defend themselves against charges of trespassing on naval land because they 
did not recognize the jurisdiction of the U.S. district court in Puerto Rico.
284
 
That debate, critical to larger discussions about Puerto Rico’s political status and 
future, likely had to be set aside in order to engage in rights discourse and work 
within the U.S. civil rights paradigm. The Project’s penchant for litigation argu-
ably legitimized the United States’ hold over Puerto Rico, as several of the Pro-
ject’s high-proﬁle cases resulted in unfavorable judgments for the independen-
tistas.
285
 Spending the Project’s limited resources on litigation that conﬁrmed 
what Puerto Ricans already knew from experience could be seen as counterpro-
ductive at best. 
The Project’s prominent litigation also risked having people put too much 
faith in the legal system, which is one of Tushnet’s principal concerns in The 
Critique of Rights.
286
 Although Berkan recognizes that much of the legal activity 
that occurred in the late 1970s helped amplify the response to the Vieques block-
ade, for instance, at the time she was troubled that the focus on litigation would 
“take the oxygen out of movements.”
287
 She did not want people to misconstrue 
the role of the legal system and have them believe that litigation alone had a 
totalizing power for sociopolitical change.
288
 
Adalina De Jesús, a Puerto Rican civil rights attorney who was part of the 
Instituto and later worked as Hey Maestre’s law-ﬁrm partner, shares Berkan’s 
 
282. Id. 
283. Besides what I gathered from conducting interviews, I have not come across other accounts 
of this disagreement. I have not been able to interview older Puerto Rican independentistas 
who would be able to provide more information about the “dissonant philosophical strains” 
that Franklin Siegel told me about. 
284. Baiges Chapel was a member of the Central Committee of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party. 
See Puerto Ricans Vow to Avenge Death in U.S. Prison, supra note 222. 
285. See, e.g., Camacho v. Autoridad de Telefonos de Puerto Rico, 868 F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(affirming the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by independentistas against a telephone com-
pany for helping the federal government to spy on them); Soto v. Romero Barceló, 559 F. 
Supp. 739 (D.P.R. 1983) (awarding attorney’s fees to the Governor of Puerto Rico after he 
won a civil rights case brought by independentistas against him). 
286. See Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, supra note 39. 
287. Telephone Interview with Judith Berkan, supra note 134. 
288. See id. 
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concern. De Jesús argues that while rights discourse is important in that it both 
lets people know what they are entitled to and helps people make demands of 
the necessary authorities, this value is limited.
289
 De Jesús contends that having 
a community look solely to the legal system for relief might distract from a gov-
ernment’s broader “lack of commitment” to educate and provide for its own peo-
ple.
290
 Meanwhile, Ramírez also agrees that the value of litigation can be nar-
row—it is speciﬁc to one moment, one client. He would not go so far as to say 
that people engaged in political organizing solely due to their relationship with 
the Instituto.
291
 These concerns echo Tushnet’s concern about lawyers overesti-
mating the potency of a legal victory.
292
 In that way, the Project and its progeny 
might have forsaken community development to get their day in court. 
While it is important to keep those limitations in mind, one should not lose 
sight of the historical forces at play in Puerto Rico. It is difficult to imagine what 
would have happened to independentista and progressive causes on the island 
had Grant and the other union leaders not approached CCR and the Guild in the 
1970s. The government-sponsored attacks against these groups would have 
likely continued to silence progressives and independentistas through court or-
ders, threats, and outright violence. It is useful to recall Crenshaw’s take on 
rights discourse, and how she describes Black people’s decision to engage with 
the American legal apparatus, though stemming from a position of “self-de-
fense,” as a radical, “calculated political act[].”
293
 Though the colonial context in 
Puerto Rico is not identical to the experiences of Black America, there similarly 
needed to be a legal response on the island as Grant and his colleagues indicated, 
and attorneys like Berkan, Schachter, and others later realized. Not doing so 
likely would have further compromised Puerto Ricans’ ability not only to defend 
themselves from these attacks, but also to ﬁght back. 
Furthermore, in ﬁxating on what the Project was or was not able to accom-
plish by engaging with the courts, one runs the risk of ignoring the community 
ties that the Project facilitated. For instance, people like Berkan, Colón Morera, 
Hey Maestre, Ramírez, and Vargas Acosta continued to collaborate with young 
Puerto Ricans. As advocates, professors, and mentors, they promoted the im-
portance of working in the public interest long after leaving the Project and the 
Instituto. That being said, many of the Puerto Ricans whom I interviewed for 
this Note remain deeply skeptical of the power of litigation alone to achieve social 
 
289. See Telephone Interview with Adalina De Jesús, supra note 254. 
290. Id. 
291. See Telephone Interview with William Ramírez, supra note 237. 
292. See supra Section I.A. 
293. Crenshaw, supra note 63, at 1382. 




 Ramírez, for one, believes that “litigation does not change anything” 
on its own.
295
 Contrary to proponents of CLS, however, Ramírez considers that 
multifaceted advocacy—which includes community education, local forms of or-
ganizing, and litigation—has the potential to create the consciousness that can 
bring about social change. Ramírez’s view mirrors the legacy of the Project, and 
of rights discourse more generally, in Puerto Rico. Litigation and other forms of 
legal work were not only useful, but also necessary, to defend and support other 
forms of activism. Thus, Ramírez and others see what CLS does not: how liti-
gation and rights talk can help educate and empower a colonized people. 
conclusion 
The history of Puerto Rico and the Project stand at odds with the critique of 
rights theory and its resistance to engaging with an inherently defective court 
system. Working in a context of legal, political, and social repression, Puerto Ri-
cans were forced to ask not simply whether they should use courts, but instead, 
“[h]ow do we defend our movements that are under attack?”
296
 The question 
facing progressive and independentista advocates in the 1970s complicated 
whether they could continue to afford prioritizing anticolonial principles when 
their causes were effectively being shredded by repressive colonial apparatuses. 
Puerto Ricans thus took a chance on litigation to safeguard their causes from 
systemic subjugation. 
On the one hand, the critique of rights is advantageous in that it helps ex-
plain why U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico have suffered from legal and political re-
pression due to Puerto Rico’s colonial status. On the other hand, Puerto Ricans 
have had to leverage the limited beneﬁts or guarantees that come with rights 
based on citizenship to insulate their own ideas and movements from sabotage 
at the hands of the United States. I do not mean to suggest that we should do 
away with the critique of rights completely. The critique of rights is useful to a 
point; however, as CRT and LatCrit scholars argue, it does not fully capture 
Puerto Ricans’ lived realities, or how they have had to be resourceful and ﬂexible 
to survive. 
More importantly, Puerto Ricans were able to galvanize enough legal and 
political pressure to interrupt colonial tactics that were relentlessly repressing 
parts of Puerto Rico’s political identity. It is precisely because the Project and its 
attorneys looked beyond winning legal victories that we can learn from what 
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happened leading up to, and following, the litigation. The Project’s value lay not 
necessarily in producing a favorable court decision, but in bringing independen-
tista and progressive Puerto Ricans together through rights discourse to openly 
articulate and ﬁght for ideas that were being brutally targeted. Going into court 
was only part of a larger process that let Puerto Ricans in that moment shift from 
living in a defensive state to getting closer to envisioning new realities for their 
communities. Contrary to the CLS position, in the case of Puerto Rico, engaging 
and working with the law as an agent for mobilization was inherently valuable. 
Doing law gave Puerto Ricans the community-based capacity and skill they 
needed to be their own advocates, a deeply disruptive development in the history 
of a colonized nation. 
As Puerto Rico ﬁnds itself in another difficult juncture in its history,
297
 net-
works based on collaboration and solidarity will prove crucial to its recovery. 
Although the circumstances that ﬁrst engendered the Project do not mirror 
Puerto Rico’s current crisis, Puerto Ricans can use some of the Project’s strate-
gies to engage in nation-building work. Through rights-based strategies, law-
yers can hold governmental and institutional actors accountable, obtain and dis-
seminate information, and provide legal services to those who lack access to 
them. That tactic has not been lost on Puerto Ricans after the 2017 hurricane 
season. Days after Hurricanes Irma and Maria ravaged the island, Puerto Ricans, 
members of the Puerto Rican diaspora, and U.S. legal organizations mobilized 
to provide disaster-relief legal support in areas like FEMA claims, unemploy-
ment and labor issues, and housing and insurance needs.
298
 On September 21, 
2017, two days after Hurricane Maria hit Puerto Rico, a group of community 
lawyers and U.S. entities started a legal support initiative called Ayuda Legal 
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 ALHM, now called Ayuda Legal Puerto Rico, Inc., 
was the ﬁrst disaster-relief initiative in Puerto Rico dedicated to providing free 
and accessible legal information about disaster relief, developing capacity among 
Puerto Rican legal professionals to supply legal aid in this context, and offering 
legal advice to Puerto Ricans affected by the storm.
300
 Ariadna Godreau-Aubert, 
a human-rights lawyer and community activist, was the coordinator of ALHM 
and now serves as the Executive Director of Ayuda Legal Puerto Rico.
301
 She 
describes the initiative’s role as providing comprehensive help to communities 
in need, doing its work via community leaders and community-based organiza-
tions.
302
 Echoing the philosophy of the Project and its progeny, Godreau-Aubert 




Like when the Project began, the legal support is not happening in a vacuum. 
Berkan, who continues to live on the island, said that now, “[w]e really have to 
rethink everything.”
304
 She described post-Maria Puerto Rico as having “a very 
conscious process going on, with a lot of people thinking about the Puerto Rico 
that we want to construct . . . . There is no solidiﬁed movement, but there’s a lot 
of . . . effervescence.”
305
 
Perhaps more salient after Hurricanes Maria and Irma, Puerto Ricans are fo-
cused on creating better working conditions, handling housing problems, deal-
ing with the distribution of water, electricity, and other basic services, and ad-
dressing gender violence and violence in society more generally.
306
 Vargas Acosta 
does not think that tackling those individual issues necessarily means that you 
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have to let go of tackling the broader colonial question. She admitted, “It’s not 
easy. I can’t not do this work because . . . we have to . . . focus on resolving the 
colonial status . . . . [W]e need to do that, but, in the meantime, we have to work 
on all these other things, too.”
307
 Though the changes that Puerto Rico needs 
will not all happen in court, by pairing community lawyering with organizing, 
Puerto Ricans will be able to look to their own and, once again, envision, ﬁght 
for, and build their own fate. 
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